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THE EASY CASE FOR DERIVATIVES USE: ADVOCATING A
CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTY TO USE DERIVATIVES
EDWARD S. ADAMS*
DAVID E. RUNKLE**
In the 1990s, derivatives left their mark in newspaper head-
lines, financial statements of corporations, and the minds of
brokers, CEOs, shareholders, lawyers, regulators, legislators,
and investors worldwide. Two very distinct perceptions of deriv-
atives have emerged, depending on one's level of sophistication
and personal experience with derivatives. To victims of misused
derivatives, with inadequate information, they can be seen as a
herd of stampeding zebras: terrifying and destructive. Contain-
ing their power can be a mystery. From this perspective, avoid-
ance is the only safe harbor. To the savvy investor, derivatives
are more akin to a team of horses. Harnessed and used appro-
priately, they are productive, efficient tools that maximize re-
sources and reduce risk; however, when inadequately harnessed
or misused, they have the ability to deliver a painful bite or
even a fatal kick.
In all fairness to the "derivaphobes," good reason exists to be
wary. During the 1990s, derivatives were blamed for major fi-
nancial losses across every sector of the economy. They spared
no industry and chose indiscriminately between large and small,
new and old companies. From 1983 to 1993, the total reported
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monetary loss attributed to derivatives was about $2.1 billion.1
In 1994 alone, however, this loss mushroomed to $10 billion.2
Some of the most notable publicly reported or acknowledged
derivatives losses include:? Gibson Greetings ($20.7 million);4
Proctor & Gamble ($157 million);5 MG Corp., the U.S. subsidiary
of Germany's Metallgesellschaft AG ($1.5 billion);6 Dell Comput-
er ($43 to $53 million);7 Atlantic Richfield Co. ($22 million);8
1. See Kevin Muehring, The Year of the Client, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Mar.
1995, at 31-32; Lauren A. Teigland, Derivatives Disputes and Disappointments: The
"SAD" Phenomenon of Derivatives Litigation, 64 BANKING REP. (BNA) 703, at *3
(Apr. 3, 1995), available in LEXIS, Banking Library, Bnabnk File (citing Aaron
Pressman, "Market in Review," BOND BUYER, July 27, 1994, at 6).
2. See Muehring, supra note 1, at 32.
3. See generally Andrew Leckey, Derivatives: 1 More Reason to Be an Informed
Investor, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 18, 1994, at C3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Chtrib
File (warning investors of potential problems with derivatives); Joanne Medero et al.,
Investing in Derivatives: Current Litigation Issues, INSIGHT MAG., Nov. 1994, at 4 n.2
(listing companies that have reported or acknowledged losses); Matt Murray & Gary
Putka, Mellon Bank Plans a Charge of $130 Million, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1994, at
A2 (examining large loss caused by risky derivatives investing).
4. For a complete explanation of all of the pertinent financial transactions lead-
ing up to Gibson's loss, see Carla E. Craig & Daniel Hume, "Nightmare 2-Custom-
ers": Recent Litigation Between Derivatives Dealers and Their Customers Involving Is-
sues of Fraud, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Suitability, Etc., and Regulator and Indus-
try Response, in UNDERSTANDING THE BUSINESS, BANKRUPTCY AND SECURTmS AS-
PECTS OF DERIVATIVES 1995, at 67, 170-76 (PLI Comm. L. and Prac. Course Hand-
book Series No. A-721, 1995); Medero et al., supra note 3, at 4 n.2 (reporting that
Gibson Greetings losses were $23 million); see also Carol J. Loomis, Untangling the
Derivatives Mess, FORTUNE, Mar. 20, 1995, at 50, 59 (providing a chronological and
detailed breakdown of the tangled events and emotions -leading up to Gibson Greet-
ings' substantial losses).
5. See Jennifer A. Frederick, Note, Not Just for Widows & Orphans Anymore:
The Inadequacy of Current Suitability Rules for the Derivatives Market, 64 FORDHAM
L. REV. 97, 100 (1995); Loomis, supra note 4, at 62. Both authors point out that
these amounts are pre-tax figures. For a complete explanation of all of the pertinent
financial transactions leading up to Proctor & Gamble's loss, see Craig & Hume, su-
pra note 4, at 176-81.
6. See Christopher L. Culp & Steve H. Hanke, Derivative Dingbats, INT'L ECON.,
July-Aug. 1994, at 12. Metallgesellschaft's loss has been referred to as a text book
example of the business community's faulty understanding of hedging strategies. For
a complete analysis of Metallgesellschafts loss, see Anotoli Kuprianov, Derivative De-
bacles: Case Studies of Large Losses in Derivatives Markets, ECON. Q., Sept. 22,
1995, passim.
7. See Brandon Becker & Jennifer Yoon, Derivative Financial Losses, 21 J. CORP.
L. 215, 227 (1995).
8. See id. at 230.
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Marion Merrell Dow Inc. ($11.1 to $13.9 million);9 Mead Corp.
($7.4 million);' ° Paramount Communications ($20 million);1'
Caterpillar Financial Services Unit ($11.5 million);12 City Colleg-
es of Chicago (approximately $48 million);13 Odessa College ($10
million to $22 million);14 Escambia County, Florida ($25 mil-
lion);'5 and Wisconsin's investment fund ($95 million).16
Two of the most infamous and devastating derivatives catas-
trophes ended in bankruptcy. One of England's oldest banks,
Barings PLC, founded in 1763,'7 could not survive an estimated
$1 billion loss attributed to derivatives. 8 Orange County, Cali-
fornia, one of the wealthiest counties in the country, filed for
Chapter 9 bankruptcy after suffering a loss of almost $2 billion
as a result of derivative misuse.' 9 According to their broker,
9. See Jeff Bailey, Marion Merrell Dow Is Suing Askin, Alleging it Was Misled on
Investments, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1994, at A4.
10. See Becker & Yoon, supra note 7, at 226.
11. See Paramount Takes Write-Off, WALL ST. J., July 6, 1994, at D16.
12. See Becker & Yoon, supra note 7, at 226.
13. See Laurie Cohen & Karen Brandon, Orange County Ills Open Hornet's Nest;
Other Governmental Units Wondering What Potential Dangers May Lurk in Their Fi-
nancial Portfolios, CIH. TRIB., Dec. 18, 1994, at 23, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Chitrib File; Reynolds Holding, Suits Sure to Follow Bankruptcy: Assessing
Blame in Orange County, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 10, 1994, at Al, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Sfchron File.
14. See G. Bruce Knecht, I Owe U.: How a Texas College Mortgaged Its Future in
Derivatives Debacle, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1994, at Al; Leslie Wayne, Local Govern-
ments Lose Millions in Complex and Risky Securities, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1994, at
1; Leslie Wayne, The Search for Municipal 'Cowboys,' N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1994, at
Dl.
15. See G. Bruce Knecht, The Aftermath: Hit by Derivatives, Florida County Tries
to Decide What to Do, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 1995, at Al (explaining how derivatives
losses led to cuts in capital improvements).
16. See G. Bruce Knecht, Wisconsin Fund Records a Loss on Derivatives, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 24, 1995, at A3. For a discussion of over 100 other recent derivatives losses
see Becker & Yoon, supra note 7, at 221-39.
17. See Roberto Coloma, Rogue Trader Leeson to Be Freed After Paying His Dues,
AGENE FRANCE-PRESsE, June 29, 1999, at *1, available in 1999 WL 2629875.
18. See Richard W. Stevenson, Big Gambles, Lost Bets Sank a Venerable Firm,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at Al. For a complete analysis of the financial activities
leading up to Baring's demise, see Kuprianov, supra note 6.
19. See Jeff Brown, Exotic Gamblers; Orange County's Woes Prompt Rush to Regu-
late Municipal Investments, PrIT. POST-GAZETrE, Dec. 9, 1994, at C8, available in
LEXIS News Library, Pstgaz File; Noel Fung, Guidelines to Be Set on Derivatives
Trading, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 22, 1994 at 1, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Schina File. For a complete explanation of all of the pertinent financial trans-
2000]
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Merrill Lynch, however, the portfolio could have rebounded to its
full $21 billion value, plus $300 million in interest, if Orange
County had ridden out the losses for a few more months.2" A
flurry of investigation and litigation, both civil and criminal, has
surrounded Merrill Lynch ever since the county's bankruptcy fil-
ing.21 The brokerage firm recently agreed to pay a $2 million
penalty to settle SEC charges of negligence in the company's
dealings with Orange County.22 The settlement closed the door
on over three years of controversy and litigation concerning
Merrill and the Orange County debacle. Previously, Merrill set-
tled with the county for $437.1 million in a civil suit and agreed
to pay $30 million to resolve a criminal investigation.23 Merrill
consistently denied any wrongdoing throughout all legal proceed-
ings.24
The Asian currency crisis of early 1998 renewed skepticism
about the safety of derivatives.25 In February 1998, J.P. Morgan
& Co. filed suit against a large South Korean bank and a South
Korean securities firm, SK Securities Co., for their inability to
fulfill obligations on swap contracts involving exchange of U.S.
dollars for various Southeast Asian currencies.26 SK Securities
filed its own lawsuit against J.P. Morgan in Korea for failing to
adequately inform SK Securities and other local investors about
the risks involved in the derivatives transactions. 7
The sharp devaluation of the Russian ruble in mid-August of
1998 continues to shake investors' confidence in the foreign mar-
ket and the use of derivatives. 28 In addition to allowing the ru-
actions leading up to Orange County's loss, see Craig & Hume, supra note 4, at
181-84.
20. See Rita Koselka, If You Can't Stand the Heat .... FoRBES, Feb. 12, 1996,
at 37.
21. See Andrew Pollack & Leslie Wayne, Ending Suit, Merrill Lynch to Pay Cali-
fornia County $400 Million, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1998, at Al.
22. See John R. Emshwiller & Charles Gasparino, Merrill Agrees to Settle with
SEC over Orange County Charges, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1998, at B5.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See Timothy L. O'Brien, J.P. Morgan in Korea Battle on Derivatives: More
U.S. Implications Seen from Asian Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1998, at D1.
26. See Stephen E. Frank, J.P. Morgan Sues Korea's SK Securities and a Bank
over Derivatives Dealings, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1998, at B25.
27. See id.
28. See Nicholas D. Kristof & Sheryl Wu Dunn, Of World Markets, None an Is-
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ble's value to drop thirty-four percent, the government also is-
sued a ninety-day moratorium on payments of foreign debt.29
Western banks will experience substantial losses if the Russian
banks refuse to honor the over $10 billion worth of currency
deals with foreign lenders. 0 Although most American banks can
absorb the losses of the ruble devaluation, some have experi-
enced severe losses. 1 The Republic New York Corporation re-
ported losses in Russia equal to its total third-quarter earnings
for 1998.
These devastating losses did not have to occur. Properly used,
derivatives have more advantages than disadvantages. Deriva-
tives offset business risks, such as fluctuating interest and for-
eign exchange rates and commodity prices. In fact, the costs of
not using derivatives vastly outweigh the costs of using them.
Despite high profile losses, derivatives use has exploded
throughout the 1990s.3 2 Between 1995 and 1996, the use of in-
terest rate swaps, currency swaps, and interest rate options con-
tracts grew by 37.1%."3 This statistic indicates that derivatives
are an indispensable tool in corporate investment portfolios.
This Article hypothesizes that directors have a duty to share-
holders to investigate and evaluate how derivatives could mini-
mize risk to their organization. Even more, corporations have a
duty to use derivatives if overall portfolio risk will thereby be
reduced. Part I of this Article defines and describes the major
types of derivatives and explains how and why they are used.'
Part H investigates the risks of derivatives, comparing these
land, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1999, at Al.
29. See Russian Ruble Takes a Plunge/Its Value Drops by 34%, NEWSDAY (N.Y.),
Aug. 18, 1998, at A6, available in LEXIS, News Library, Newsdy File.
30. See Edmund L. Andrews, Russia is Caught in a Financial Quandary: Loss of
Credibility on One Hand, Risk of Banking Collapse on Other, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20,
1998, at D5.
31. See Timothy L. O'Brien, Republic Says Loss in Russia Will Erase Quarter's
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1998, at D6.
32. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS
NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, GAO/GGD-94-133, at 3-9 (1994) [here-
inafter GAO REPORT].
33. See Laurie Morse, Derivatives: Traders Turn Credit Risks into Profits, FIN.
TIMES, May 23, 1997, at 3.
34. See infra notes 39-158 and accompanying text.
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risks to other investment instruments.35 Part III introduces a
new conceptualization of derivatives through exploration of three
issues surrounding their use: (1) brokers' liabilities to investors
when financial losses result; (2) corporate liability to sharehold-
ers for losses; and (3) the possibility that in certain contexts, a
corporation has a duty to its shareholders to use derivatives to
manage business risk.36 Part IV proposes a risk management
strategy designed to minimize the inherent risks of derivatives
and to maximize their advantages in managing ordinary busi-
ness risk. Part V concludes with a look to the future of deriva-
tives.8
I. WHAT IS A DERIVATIVE?
Peter Hancock, head of Global Derivatives at J.P. Morgan,
explains rather inaccurately that "derivatives... seem to have
come to mean anything that lost money."39 A more formal defini-
tion of a derivative is: a financial instrument, or contract, be-
tween two parties that derives its value from some other under-
lying asset or underlying reference price, interest rate, or in-
dex.4" Although there are over 1200 different types of derivatives
in existence,4' many of which can be combined in complex
ways,42 almost all of them fall into one of four major categories:
35. See infra notes 159-266 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 267-422 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 423-91 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 492-530 and accompanying text.
39. Muehring, supra note 1, at 31.
40. See KENDALL BACKSTRAND, INTRODUCTION TO DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS 1
(Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. 9-295-141, 1997); see also THE GROUP OF TIR-
TY, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES 28-29 (1993); Geoffrey B. Goldman,
Note, Crafting a Suitability Requirement for the Sale of Over-the-Counter Derivatives:
Should Regulators "Punish the Wall Street Hounds of Greed"?, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1112, 1116 & n.16 (1995) (stating that this broad definition is problematic for regu-
lators because it technically includes numerous financial transactions and agreements
that either specifically have not been designated as "derivatives' or have been in-
tentionally exempted from the definition).
41. See Clarence B. Manning, A Derivatives Primer for Corporate Council, or Do
You Know What Your Treasurer Is Doing?, ACCA DOCKET, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 6, 8.
42. See Goldman, supra note 40, at 1116; see also Jerry W. Markham, 'Confeder-
ate Bonds," 'General Custer," and the Regulation of Derivative Financial Instruments,
25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 1-5 (1994) (explaining that derivatives have been in use,
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forwards, futures, options, and swaps.' These categories can be
further divided into exchange-traded" and over-the-counter (OTC)
derivatives.45 All futures and many options contracts have been
standardized and are traded on established exchanges.46 Other
derivatives, such as forwards, swaps, and some options, are
custom-tailored contracts.4 7 These derivatives are referred to as
OTC derivatives because they are not traded on exchanges, but
rather typically are negotiated between counterparties.48
A. How and Why Derivatives Are Used
Prior to the 1990s, knowledge about derivatives was uncom-
mon outside of the most sophisticated investment circles. Today,
approximately seventy-five percent of the largest companies in
the United States use derivatives. 49 The market for derivatives
has been estimated to be in the trillions of dollars.5" According to
the United States General Accounting Office, the surge in deriv-
ative use within the past two decades is due to "fundamental
in some form, for thousand of years and that there is evidence that fairly complex
derivatives were used before the Civil War).
43. See Goldman, supra note 40, at 1116.
44. See id. at 1118. Exchange-traded derivatives are standardized contracts that
are traded in organized trading facilities and are subject to regulation by either the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission or the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion. For a thorough discussion of the fragmented regulation of derivatives, see Fred-
erick, supra note 5, at 107-21; Goldman, supra note 40, at 1118.
45. See Goldman, supra note 40, at 1118. OTC derivatives tend to be more com-
plex and less predictable than exchange-traded derivatives because they are rarely
standardized as to contract terms. This, in turn, makes it more difficult to regulate.
See id.
46. See id. "Standardized" refers to the continuity of contract terms, such as matu-
rity date, contract size and delivery terms. See Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail
Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1996).
47. A custom-tailored contract is a contract in which virtually every element, such
as the quantity of the underlying asset, the method of determining payments, and
the duration of the contract are customized to the individual parties' needs. Because
they tend not to be standardized, often they are very complex, sometimes consisting
of a combination of many simpler derivatives. See Goldman, supra note 40, at 1118.
48. See id.
49. See Kelley Holland & Zachary Schiller, Did Proctor & Gamble Play with Fire?,
BUS. WK., Apr. 25, 1994, at 38.
50. See Romano, supra note 46, at 4. The exact size is difficult to determine be-
cause no mechanism exists to track the OTC contracts, which compose a large seg-
ment of the entire market. See id.
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changes in global financial markets."5' Those changes have led
to increased demand for cost-effective protection against the
risks known to result from movements in foreign exchange rates,
interest rates, equities, and commodity prices.52
The recent "Group of Thirty Survey" reported that ninety-four
percent of Fortune 500 CEOs are satisfied with their firm's use
of derivatives.53 How are these derivatives being used? Although
new uses for derivatives are being created continuously, most
fall within two broad categories: hedging and speculation. Al-
though most corporations use derivatives to hedge against ad-
verse changes in the value of assets or liabilities, many inves-
tors, including some corporations, use derivatives to speculate in
an attempt to profit by anticipating changes in market rates or
prices.
Eighty-two percent of the corporations recently surveyed use
derivatives to hedge against market risks arising from new fi-
nancing arrangements.54 Seventy-eight percent use derivatives
to manage or modify the characteristics of their existing assets
and liabilities, and thirty-three percent use derivatives to hedge
against foreign currency exposure.55 When properly used as a
means of hedging against existing risk, derivatives minimize
rather than create risk. In fact, the Economist Intelligence Unit
reported that despite "press coverage of so-called risky financial
derivatives... [their use] is a critical factor in reapportioning
and reducing companies' overall risks."56 "Hedging" refers specif-
ically to the activity of mitigating economic risk or loss through
the use of a counterbalancing or negatively correlated invest-
ment.57 Hedging requires an end-user to identify specific busi-
ness assets that are subject to price fluctuations and then to
purchase derivatives that offset or counteract the effects of a
51. GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 3.
52. See Romano, supra note 46, at 24.
53. See GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 40.
54. See id. at 36.
55. See id. at 37.
56. Derivatives Reconsidered, from a Balanced Perspective; New Report and Survey
from the Economist Intelligence Unit Sheds Fresh Light on Heated Derivatives Con-
troversy, BUS. WIRE, Feb. 16, 1995, at [hereinafter Derivatives Reconsidered] available
in LEXIS, News Library, Bwire File.
57. See Frederick, supra note 5, at 105 n.53.
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change in the price of those assets.58 Hedging ensures compen-
sating gains for losses caused by underlying market move-
ments.59 Importantly, hedging is not designed to increase an
investment's return, but rather to make an uncertain outcome
less variable. Thus, hedging not only reduces losses but also
impairs gains on an asset with a variable price.6"
Although a majority of corporations employ derivatives to
hedge existing or anticipated risks, it is difficult to find a party
on the other side of the market to whom risk can be transferred.
Speculators fill this void. Speculators assume the risks of hedg-
ers in an attempt to profit by predicting market movements.61 As
such, it should be no surprise that speculators have been the
"largest derivatives losers in the recent past."62 Speculators play
an important part in the derivative market by ensuring ade-
quate liquidity; however, their function is a dangerous one. Al-
though they often earn far greater yields than are available
elsewhere,63 they can just as easily suffer devastating losses.64
The following subsections provide a basic discussion of the
four major types of derivatives and how they can be used for
hedging and speculation.
B. Forward Contracts
A forward contract is an agreement between two parties to
"buy or sell an underlying asset at a specified price and future
date."6" This agreement creates a pair of obligations: (1) The
buyer must purchase the underlying asset from the seller at the
58. See Goldman, supra note 40, at 1118-19.
59. See id. at 1119.
60. See Romano, supra note 46, at 9.
61. See GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 25.
62. Romano, supra note 46, at 5; see also Goldman, supra note 40, at 1112-13
(suggesting less sophisticated derivatives users involved in speculating are responsi-
ble for some of the recent substantial losses).
63. See Dominic Bencivenga, Derivatives Litigation: Parties Argue over 'Degrees" of
Sophistication, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 1, 1994, at 5.
64. See, e.g., Craig & Hume, supra note 4 (providing explanations of four of the
most famous derivative losses).
65. Goldman, supra note 40, at 1116-17. Money and goods do not change hands at
the contract's inception; rather, the dual obligations are performed at the maturity
date of the contract. See Romano, supra note 46, at 7.
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contract's maturity date; and (2) the seller must sell the asset to
the buyer at the agreed-upon price regardless of current fair
market value.66 The buyer is said to be in the "long position"; the
seller in the "short position." 7 Forward contracts eliminate price
uncertainty by fixing the price in advance of purchase. While
fixing the future price of the underlying asset reduces the risk of
loss from adverse price changes, it also reduces the possibility of
gain from positive price changes." The certainty of future prices
benefits an investor by enabling her to plan future transactions
more accurately, thus reducing the costs of conducting busi-
ness.
69
The value of a forward contract is determined by the value of
the underlying asset.7" At inception, the contract value is zero
because neither party has paid nor received any value.71 When
the market price of the underlying asset changes, so does the
value of the contract.7 2 If the value of the underlying asset in-
creases in value after the contract is created, the value of the
long position becomes positive and the value of the short posi-
tion becomes negative.7 ' The opposite is true if the value of the
underlying asset decreases in value after the contract is created.
A key characteristic of a forward contract is that it is a zero-sum
game; one party's gain is equal to the other's loss.74
Forwards are not exchange-traded, but rather, the contract
terms such as asset quantity and contract duration are negotiat-
ed individually between the counterparties. As a result of their
highly individualized nature, the contracts are not conducive to
mass trading on an exchange.
Speculators use forwards based purely on their predictions as
to which direction the market will move. For example, if a spec-
ulator expects the price of an asset to rise, she will take a long
66. See Romano, supra note 46, at 7.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 9.
69. See id. at 7.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 7 n.20.
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position in the forward market.75 The speculator will enter into a
forward contract for an asset in the hope that the price of the
asset will rise by the delivery date. She will then be able to pur-
chase the asset at the forward contract price (less than the mar-
ket value), and sell it in the spot market for a profit. In contrast,
if the speculator believes the price of an asset will fall, she will
take a short position in the market.76 In this case, the speculator
will enter into a forward contract for an asset expecting that by
the delivery date the price of the asset will have decreased in
the spot market, thereby allowing her to sell the asset at the
forward contract price for a profit.
Dow Chemical Company, a worldwide manufacturer and seller
of chemicals, plastic materials, agricultural and consumer prod-
ucts, operates production facilities throughout Europe, Asia-Pa-
cific and Canada. Due to the global nature of their business,
they are exposed to fluctuations in the valuation of assets and
liabilities denominated in foreign currencies. In addition, curren-
cy fluctuations can affect the dollar value of future cash flows at
the operating income level. Dow hedges to optimize the dollar
value of the company's assets, liabilities and future cash flows.
77
Dow enters forward contracts with major international financial
institutions to stabilize the rates on exchange of foreign currency
to dollars.
C. Futures Contracts
Futures are similar to forwards in that the parties are con-
tracting for the exchange of a specific asset at a future date.78
The key difference is that futures contracts are standardized and
must be traded on an organized exchange. Standardization en-
ables transferability that, in turn, enables exchange trading.79
75. See id. at 9.
76. See id.
77. See DOW CHEMICAL Co., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 36 (1997).
78. See GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 26. Some of the most common types of
futures are based on financial indexes, agricultural products, or other commodities.
See Goldman, supra note 40, at 1117. Like forwards, no money exchanges hands un-
til the maturity date of the future. See Romano, supra note 46, at 10, 13-14.
79. See Romano, supra note 46, at 10. The largest futures exchanges are the Chi-
cago Board of Trade and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. See id
2000] 605
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Exchange trading of standardized contracts enables parties to
settle for the cash value of the contract rather than an actual
transfer of the underlying asset.8 °
An exchange provides an organized, central location where
buyers and sellers of standardized contracts trade."' The ex-
change creates contracts that are likely to generate significant
demand82 in order to ensure sufficient liquidity"3 in the market.
The contracts are standardized as to a variety of terms such as
the price, price fluctuations, delivery terms and procedures, and
contract duration.8 4 Because of their standardization, it is signif-
icantly easier for a trader to close out a futures position than a
forward position.85 By acquiring both a long and a short position
in the same contract, the investor nets zero because each con-
tract cancels the other out. Closing out a futures contract in this
way is a simple bookkeeping maneuver86 that avoids many of the
obstacles associated with closing out a forward contract.8 The
close out feature of futures contracts makes it easier and less
expensive to find parties to purchase futures. More traders are
willing to assume the obligations of either side of a contract
80. See Romano, supra note 46, at 13; Goldman, supra note 40, at 1117 n.18.
81. See Romano, supra note 46, at 10.
82. See id. For an asset to produce a successful futures contract, its market price
must be volatile, creating incentive to reduce the price risk. See id. In addition, the
asset must be homogeneous and of abundant supply to ensure competitive prices and
eliminate disputes over value. For example, when the price of ketchup and butter
became predictable due to production and shipping technologies, the need to reduce
price risk no longer existed; thus, they are no longer traded on an exchange. See id.
83. Although liquidity is a complex phenomenon, as used herein liquidity refers to
the supply of buyers available for individuals selling contracts and the supply of
sellers available for individuals buying contracts. See THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIO-
NARY OF ECONOMICS 211 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1998).
84. See id. at 211.
85. Closing out a position refers to the process of concluding an investment trans-
action, thus satisfying or eliminating all outstanding financial and/or delivery obliga-
tions, either by the occurrence of the maturity date and the fulfillment of the con-
tract terms or by taking some action prior to this date that accomplishes the same
result, such as purchasing the other side of the contract. See Romano, supra note
46, at 10-13.
86. See id. at 20. The bookkeeping involves closing out the position with the clear-
inghouse.
87. See id. at 7, 12-13 (describing how futures avoid such obstacles as negotiating
with the party to the original contract to terminate or assign the contract, br being
obligated to make or take delivery of the underlying asset and providing a more
complete explanation of futures trading).
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when they can close out their position without having to make
or take physical delivery of the underlying asset, as is usually
required in forward contracts.88 Investors outside of the underly-
ing asset industry, having no interest in receiving delivery or no
convenient means of delivering the underlying asset, are able to
engage in these contracts and assume the price risk of the asset
if they can close out by offset.89 Due to the simple and cost effec-
tive means of closing out futures positions and the inherent
standardized characteristics that they possess, futures are more
readily transferable than forwards contracts, enabling them to
have lower trading costs and wider market participation than
forwards.9"
Each futures exchange establishes a clearinghouse that acts
as an intermediary between the parties to a futures contract. 91
The clearinghouse functions as "the seller to the purchaser of
the futures contract and the purchaser to the seller of the con-
tract."92 The net position of the clearinghouse is always zero
because it enters into both sides of each contract entered into by
all investors.93 This arrangement results in the virtual elimina-
tion of credit risk, or the risk that a counterparty to a contract
will fail to perform the terms of the contract on the date speci-
fied.94 Because the clearinghouse holds as many losing positions
as winning positions, all of the losing positions are paid for by
the exact number of opposing winning positions. If a losing party
fails to pay the appropriate amount into the clearinghouse, the
clearinghouse covers this default through a system of margin
accounts and daily settlements." As a result of this clearing-
house "insurance," participants of futures transactions are sub-
ject to far less risk of nonperformance than are forward market
participants.96
88. See id.
89. See id. at 13.
90. See id. at 10-13. Closing out in this manner is made possible by the standard-
ization of futures contracts.
91. See id. at 16.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 17.
94. See id at 16-17 (describing how the clearing house guarantees performance of
a futures contract).
95. See id.
96. For a thorough explanation of clearinghouse activities, see generally id. at 16-21.
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The principal use for futures contracts, as for forward con-
tracts, is to reduce risk through hedging. Futures allow the par-
ties to guarantee the price for which they will buy or sell the
underlying asset at some future date." Changes in the value of
the underlying asset produce the same zero-sum effect that oc-
curs in forward contracts. Similarly, the same hedging strategies
that apply to forward contracts also apply to futures contracts.
As a result of the easy transferability of futures, either party is
able to close out their position simply by taking an opposite posi-
tion, thus avoiding the inconvenience of ever having to make or
take actual delivery. Most traders close out their positions prior
to the delivery date of the contract.98 A party using a futures
contract to hedge in the spot market simply purchases or sells
the underlying asset in the spot market, 99 therefore any "gain or
loss on the futures contract offsets corresponding loss or gain on
the spot market transaction." °°
Investors also employ futures to speculate in the market using
the same methods used in the forward markets. Speculating in
the futures market is more convenient than in the forward mar-
kets because of the "unique offsetting feature"10' which allows
investors the ability to avoid taking possession of the underlying
asset at the delivery date.
Texaco, a crude oil, natural gas and petroleum provider, uses
petroleum futures exchanges to "reduce the company's exposure
to price volatility by establishing margins, costs or revenues on
designated transactions as well as for planned future purchases
and sales, inventory, production and processing."102 Based on
analysis of costs, revenues, and market price changes, along
with forecasted trends, the company determines the appropriate
strategy for risk reduction.
97. See id. at 10-13.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 16-21.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 32; see also supra notes 78-90 and accompanying text (discussing the
offsetting feature of futures).
102. TExAco INc., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 66 (1997).
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D. Options Contracts
Options contracts are similar to both futures and forwards.
Each instrument derives its value from the future price of the
underlying asset. Additionally, all three types of contracts in-
volve the future purchase or sale of an asset for a predetermined
price.03 Options, however, provide the holder with the right,
rather than an obligation,0 4 "to buy or sell the [underlying] as-
set at a [predetermined] price on or before a [particular] date." 5
This feature significantly distinguishes options from both fu-
tures and forwards. The purchaser of an option pays a "premi-
um" ' 6 for the right to choose whether to perform the obligation
contained in the options contract.' ° A "call" option provides the
buyer the right to purchase the underlying asset at a specified
price' whereas a "put" option gives the buyer the right to sell
the underlying asset at a specified price.' 9 The value of the
option is dependent on the market price of the asset relative to
the option price; therefore, if the price of the underlying asset
rises above the price of the option, the "call" option becomes
more valuable."0 Conversely, if the price of the underlying asset
103. See generally Frederick, supra note 5, at 105-06 (discussing the similarities of
options and futures); Romano, supra note 46 (discussing forwards and futures).
104. See Romano, supra note 46, at 41; Goldman, supra note 40, at 1117. The buy-
er of a futures or forward contract cannot renounce her commitment to perform her
obligation on the contract if she still holds the contract at its maturity. See Romano,
supra note 46, at 41. On the other hand, the purchaser of an option maintains the
right to avoid performance of the contract on the date of maturity. See id. The
issuer of the option, also known as the option writer, does not share the purchaser's
right to avoid performance. See id.
105. Romano, supra note 46, at 40. Options that can bi exercised only on the ma-
turity date of the contract (the expiration date) are called European options. See id.
Those that can be exercised at any time up to the expiration date are called Ameri-
can options. See id
106. An option premium usually consists of a percentage of the contract or a fixed
dollar amount that the buyer of the contract is required to pay to the option writer
in exchange for the option to choose not to perform the obligations of the contract
by the date specified. See id. at 41.
107. Futures and forwards do not possess the option to choose whether to perform
the obligations of the contract and accordingly do not require the payment of a pre-
mium.
108. See Romano, supra note 46, at 40; Goldman supra note 40, at 1117 n.19.
109. See Romano, supra note 46, at 40.
110. In the case of forwards and futures, the long position or the buyer, equates to
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falls below the price of option, the "put" option becomes more
valuable."'
The primary advantage of an options contract is that it allows
the purchaser to mitigate downside risks without foregoing up-
side potential. This is possible because the loss is limited to the
amount of the premium paid to the option writer." The gain,
however, remains unlimited."' If, for example, the holder of a
call option could pay less for the underlying asset in the spot
market than by exercising her option to buy, she would not exer-
cise the option. Similarly, if the holder of a put option could sell
the underlying asset in the spot market for more than she could
by exercising her option to sell, she too would decide not to exer-
cise the option. In both cases, the loss would be limited to the
price of the premiums paid. On the other hand, if exercising the
call or put option would be more profitable than buying or sell-
ing the underlying asset in the spot market, both investors
would exercise their options and receive any gain available to
them based on the difference in prices between the spot market
and options contract. Accurately pricing many options contracts
is difficult however." Additionally, the unique nature of options
contracts allows holders to benefit from increased variance in
the performance of the underlying asset."' Options are traded
on exchanges"' and OTC. "' As with futures, exchange-traded
options operate through a clearinghouse to minimize credit risk
and to ensure sellers' performance. Long side nonperformance of
an option contract is not an issue "[b]ecause premiums are paid
up front, and buyers.. . have no obligations."" 8
the call option. See id.
111. In the case of forwards and futures, the short position or the seller, equates
to the put option. See id.
112. See id. at 41; see also supra note 106 (defining the option premium).
113. See Romano, supra note 46, at 41.
114. See id. at 42.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 4041 ("Options traded on exchange today cover many assets, includ-
ing stocks, stock indices, currencies, government bonds, and futures contracts involv-
ing agricultural commodities, metals, oil, currency, and financial instruments.").
117. See id. at 4045. Predominantly, banks and other financial institutions use this
method. See id.
118. Id. at 42.
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Options are also used as hedges against price risk.119 In fact,
options are used to hedge in essentially the same way that fu-
tures are used. Hedging with options, however, is more difficult
because of the option holder's right to walk away from the trans-
action with a loss limited to the premium paid.120 This creates a
problem in determining the number of options required to hedge
against a specific cash position. The number will vary with the
price of the asset."' This uncertainty requires a holder of an
option-hedged portfolio to perform numerous and frequent risk
analyses and to nake appropriate adjustments in order to main-
tain a position with limited risk. 22 The high maintenance costs
associated with this type of portfolio may lead either to a trans-
fer to futures-based hedging or to an inadequately protected
portfolio resulting from attempts to cut maintenance costs.'
When used for speculation, options have significant benefits
over futures and forwards. The advantage of options is that the
downside risk is reduced to the price of the premium paid.1"
This allows speculators to take "riskier" positions without being
responsible for the extent of the potential loss. Additionally,
options allow investors to construct a variety of different payoff
functions using a combination of options."'
Bausch & Lomb, an eyewear, health care, and pharma-
ceuticals company, which operates in nearly twenty countries
worldwide, uses option contracts to hedge foreign currency
transactions and equity investments in non-U.S. subsidiaries. In
1995, Bausch & Lomb invested $219 million Netherland guilders
in securities of a Dutch company. 6 To insure a minimum rate
of return on its Dutch investment in dollars, the company pur-
chased the right to call for redemption of the stock by the Dutch
company at the net asset value. If Bausch & Lomb does not
119. See id. at 45.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 45-46.
122. See id. at 46.
123. See id.
124. See supra notes 103-18 and accompanying text (describing the advantages of
options).
125. See Romano, supra note 46, at 46.
126. See BAUSCH & LOMB, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 43 (1997).
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exercise its right, the Dutch company has the reciprocal right to
buy back the stock in 2003.127
E. Swaps
Swaps 2 ' are OTC agreements between two parties to ex-
change a series of cash flows. 2 9 A common type is an interest
rate swap,' and the simplest interest rate swap is a fixed-for-
floating rate swap, also referred to as a "plain vanilla" swap.'
3
'
In a fixed-for-floating rate swap, "one counterparty agrees to
make fixed-rate payments to the other counterparty, who [in re-
turn] agrees to make floating-rate payments. " 132 Each of these
interest rate payment streams are based on a specified sum of
money known as the notional principal amount.13 3 The notional
principal amount is derived from hypothetical quantities of the
underlying asset.1 4 The notional principal amount is a reference
used to determine the interest payment streams and does not
change hands.'35
The purchaser of the swap pays the fixed-rate and holds the
long position while the seller holds the short position and pays
the floating-rate.'36 This terminology, although common in the
financial sector, does not adequately describe the conduct of the
parties. In reality, the party with the fixed-rate payment stream
is obligated to pay only if interest rates fall. 37 "Conversely, the
party with the floating-rate" payment stream is only required to
127. See id.
128. "Swaps are the largest component of the OTC derivatives market." Goldman,
supra note 40, at 1117 n.20.
129. See Romano, supra note 46, at 46.
130. See Frank C. Puleo, Recent Developments in Merchant Banking Activities of
Banks and Bank Holding Companies, in BANKING LAW AN]) REGULATION 1987, at
677, 705 (PLI Comm. L. and Prac. Course Handbook Series No. A4-4201, 1987).
131. Alexander E. Kolar, Hammersmith Meets Orange County: 'Wishing upon a
Star" with Taxpayer Money, in the Municipal Bond Derivative Market, 49 WASH. U.
J. UR. & CONTEMP. L. 315, 321-22 (1996).
132. Romano, supra note 46, at 47.
133. See id. at 46.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 47.
137. See Bruce A. Baird et al., Current Legal Theories in Litigation Involving De-
rivative Contracts, C123 ALI-ABA 291, 298 (1995).
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pay in the event that "interest rates rise."13' The interest rate
payments between parties usually occur at six-month inter-
vals. 13' Rather than paying the entire payment streams, only the
differential between the payments change hands.' For example,
if the fixed-rate payment stream is $100,000 and the floating-
rate payment stream is $95,000, the swap purchaser (fixed-rate
payer) pays $5,000 to the seller (floating-rate payer).
Another typical example would be a firm that has a commit-
ment to make fixed payments for a factory, payments of $1 mil-
lion twice a year for ten years. If part of its income is at a float-
ing rate, the firm may enter into a swap in which it receives a
fixed payment of $1 million every six months in exchange for its
floating income. The firm will reduce its total uncertainty be-
cause it will have a payment of $1 million every six months that
it can use to make the $1 million mortgage payments. Thus, the
swap reduces the total uncertainty about the firm's income and
outflow.
This type of interest rate swap is designed to reduce the effect
of interest rate volatility faced by both parties." The primary
motive for employing this type of swap is to enhance the predict-
ability of interest rate sensitive investments because both the
positive and negative effects of interest rate movements are
reduced. By using swaps in this way, an investor effectively
converts an existing instrument from a fixed to a floating inter-
est rate or vice versa.4 2 Interest rate swaps transfer interest
rate risk between the parties."3 A party with a fixed rate instru-
ment is exposed to the risk of downward movements in interest
rates. 1" An interest rate swap, however, provides the opportuni-
ty to profit from falling interest rates."45 In contrast, a party with
138. Id.
139. See Frederick, supra note 5, at 99 n.8 (citing JOHN C. HULL, INTRODUCTION TO
FUTUREs & OPTIONS MARKET 4, 153 (2d ed. 1995)).
140. See id. (citing HULL, supra note 139, at 151).
141. See generally id. at 128-30 (discussing how swaps are used to hedge against
fluctuations in the market).
142. See Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation and
the Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 346-47 (1989).
143. Baird et al., supra note 137, at 298.
144. See id.
145. See id.
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a floating rate instrument is exposed to upward movements in
interest rates. A rate swap, therefore, allows her to profit from
rising interest rates. 146
Both swaps and futures transfer risk from one party to anoth-
er. The advantage of swaps lies in the fact that they may be
OTC and thus are not constrained by the standardization re-
quirements imposed on the futures market. This allows the par-
ties to use a swap transaction to customize the swap to meet
their particular needs. This advantage is demonstrated by the
short duration of the contract, which usually lasts only three to
six months.1 47 The duration of a swap contract, however, is
based entirely on the needs of the parties and can be made for
any period of time.' Although futures usually can be combined
to accomplish a similar result, swaps provide a more efficient
and lower maintenance means of hedging investments with long-
term maturity dates. 149
Swaps are most effective as a hedging instrument when the
investor is a financial institution. 50 This is true because finan-
cial institutions often possess "mismatched asset and liability"
time frames. 151 "They lend at fixed rates for the long term (mort-
gages), but they borrow at floating rates over the short term
(deposits)."'52 Thus, "if short-term rates rise the institution will
lose money.""~ Swaps are a better hedging choice for financial
institutions than futures because futures contracts are standard-
ized and usually possess time frames of less than one year,
whereas swaps are customized and can possess time frames of
fifteen years or more.
Numerous companies employ swap agreements. PepsiCo uses
them to reduce borrowing costs. Interest rate swaps enable
PepsiCo to change the interest rate of specific debt issuances.
146. See id.
147. See Romano, supra note 46, at 65.
148. See id. Durations from two to fifteen years are not unusual. See id.
149. See id. at 46-68 (providing a comprehensive and interesting look at swaps).
150. See generally id. at 65 (discussing the use of swaps by financial institutions).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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These swaps are generally entered into concurrently with the
issuance of the debt they are intended to modify. The notion-
al amount, interest payment dates and maturity dates of the
swaps generally match the principal, interest payment dates
and maturity dates of the related debt. Accordingly, any mar-
ket risk or opportunity associated with these swaps is offset
by the opposite market impact on the related debt."M
In 1996, Sears, Roebuck & Co. used interest rate swaps to pay
a fixed, average interest rate of 8.02% on $996 million.1 55 It had
swapped this payment for receipt of interest rate payments on
the same $996 million pegged to a.variable interest rate set in
the market.'56 The floating rate averaged out at 5.44%.157 Sears
had gambled interest rates would rise, when, in fact, they were
falling. 158
II. How RISKY ARE DERIATIVES?
Based on recent press coverage, derivatives often are viewed
as "risky" investments capable of toppling even the most invest-
ment-savvy corporations.' 59 According to a 1994 Government
Finance Officers Association survey, a large number of finance
professionals believe that the risks associated with derivatives
outweighed the benefits. 6 ° Richard Graber, the senior vice presi-
dent of the Jones & Babson mutual fund complex in Kansas
City, Missouri, echoed this sentiment: "Given the choice.., the
best way to deal with derivatives is to treat them like a crazy
relative-stay away.""'
154. PEPsiCo, INC., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 37 (1997).
155. See What Are Derivatives, and How Could You Lose $382 Million with Them?,
FORBES, Aug. 11, 1997, at 43.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See Goldman, supra note 40, at 1112-13 (arguing that this perception is mak-
ing legislators and regulators reevaluate regulation of derivatives, specifically of OTC
derivatives); see also Michael E.S. Frankel, Derivatives and the Quantification 'of
Portfolio Risk by Mutual Funds, CA10 ALI-ABA 297, 300-01 (1995) (commenting on
the risks of derivatives).
160. See GOVERNMENT FINANCE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, 1994 SURVEY OF DERIVATIVE
PRODUCTS IN THE DEBT MARKET 124 (1994).
161. James Welsh, The Dreaded D Word; Derivatives Are a Risky Business (Remem-
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A. What Does "Risky" Mean?
Although derivatives are perceived widely as "more volatile or
risky than other financial instruments,"162 it is important to
understand the meaning of the term "risky." The distinction
between risk and downside risk commonly are confused. 6 ' The
term "risk" refers to the volatility, or the range of fluctuation, in
the price of an investment instrument and not the direction of
the fluctuation itself. 64 For every loss resulting from the use of
derivatives there is a corresponding gain of an equal amount
and vice versa. 65 Although large derivatives losses make the
headlines, equally large gains often go unnoticed. 66 In other
words, the more "risky" the investment, the greater the possible
gain and the greater the possible loss.
B. How Can Risk Be Measured?
How then can an investor determine the level of risk that
accompanies the use of a specific derivative? Risk measurement
has always been a difficult task. Recently, because of the "rel-
ative public ignorance concerning derivatives and their high
level of volatility," 67 risk management and risk measurement
have come to the fore of debate and investigation at the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC has focused on
"disclosure enhancement" of "risky trading instruments."168 In
1995, the SEC issued proposed rules that included implementing
a quantitative risk measure for mutual funds that attempt to
simplify risk measurement by incorporating risk measurement
into a single numeric number. 69 However, in the final rules
ber the Orange County and Barings Bank Fiascos?), but They Can Bring a Happy
Financial Return, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 19, 1995, at F3, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Notpic File.
162. Frankel, supra note 159, at 300.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 300-01 ("For instance, [although] Orange County has recently suf-
fered large losses through derivatives trading, these same instruments were a source
of unusually high returns for many years.").
167. Id. at 306.
168. Id.
169. See id. The proposed rules included three possible risk measures: the duration
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issued in 1998, the SEC, although implementing a risk/return
disclosure requirement, decided against the use of a quantitative
risk measure citing the inability of commentators to decide on
any one risk measure.17 Although this type of measurement
mechanism may be very useful for some investors, measuring
overall portfolio risk would be much more helpful than measur-
ing only specific investment components of a portfolio.17' The
development of this type of risk measurement mechanism, how-
ever, faces significant challenges. This type of risk measurement
mechanism would need to measure accurately the risks of the
numerous and varied instruments present in a typical portfolio
while taking into account the relevant effects resulting from the
interrelationships between the instruments. Finally, it would
have to convert this data into a single number or formula that
would represent accurately the level of risk for the entire portfo-
lio.17
2
One portfolio risk measurement mechanism that is currently
beingused 73 is the "value-at-risk" methodology. 7' This mechanism
monitors the risk and value of a portfolio, including non-option
derivatives holdings 175 by measuring the amount "a firm could
potentially lose by holding a position for a specific period." 76
Although the value-at-risk method does not provide a single risk
method, the standard deviation method, or the beta method. See Registration Form
Used by Open-End Management Investment Companies, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,898, 10,911
(1997) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 232, 239, 240, 270 & 274) (proposed
Mar. 10, 1997).
170. See Registration Form Used by Open-End Management nvestment Companies,
63 Fed. Reg. 13,916, 13,929 (Mar. 23, 1998) (describing the reasons for foregoing a
quantitative risk measure).
171. See generally Frankel, supra note 159, at 309-11 (discussing the calculation of
a portfolio).
172. See id. at 310.
173. See Barbara Donnelly Granito & Steven Lapin, Alarmed, World's Central
Banks Call for Full Exposure of All Risk, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1994, at C1 ("Citi-
corp became the first financial dealer to publicize its 'earnings at risk,' a probability-
weighted measure of how much the bank stands -to lose on a given day from its
trading operations.").
174. Frankel, supra note 159, at 307-09 (providing an explanation of the value-at-
risk methodology).
175. See id. at 311.
176. Michael R. Ceased, Derivatives Dealers Show Progress in Managing Risks, a
Survey Shows, WALL ST. J. EUR., Dec. 6, 1994, at B4, available in 1994 WL 3170690.
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measurement number, it does provide sets of correlations be-
tween commonly understood variables as well as between the
risks of the individual investments within a portfolio.' 7 As prac-
tical as the value-at-risk methodology may appear, it is plagued
by issues concerning accuracy and practicality. With regard to
accuracy, the value-at-risk method (as with all other commonly
used risk measurements) is based on the presumption that the
"future will mirror the past." 178 Historical volatility and correla-
tion data are used to predict future values.17' Additionally, the
data acquired is statistical, which means that aberrant and
outlying results usually are not taken into consideration. 8 ° This
can produce misleading results that hinder decision making. The
value-at-risk method also provides a series of correlating rela-
tionships and stress tests. Often this data is presented in a
confusing manner that inhibits practical use by investors.' 8'
Recently, efforts have been made to develop a forward looking
model of risk based on proprietary predictions of future volatility
rather than historical data.'82 The results of these mechanisms,
however, have yet to be realized fully. At this point in time, no
risk measurement mechanism exists that accurately measures
the risk of a portfolio containing derivatives that presents the
measurement as a simple formula or number and avoids the
problematic use of historical data. Large banks are required to
disclose interest rate risk to banking regulators as part of their
quarterly reports. 8 ' Some of those disclosures are privileged and
thus unavailable in public documents; however, many banks do
report measures of risk in their annual reports."8
177. See Frankel, supra note 159, at 309.
178. Id. at 312.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 312-13.
181. See id. at 313.
182. See id. at 309, 313; see also Campbell R. Harvey & Robert E. Whaley, Market
Volatility Prediction and the Efficiency of the S&P 100 Index Option Market, 31 J.
FIN. ECON. 43, 43 (1992).
183. See Isaac Lustgarten & Jualing Ma, Risk Management Guidelines for Deriva-
tives, REV. BANKING & FIN. SERV., Apr. 19, 1995, at *1, *9, available in 1995 WL
8599892.
184. See Troy J. Butner & Richard L. Brezovec, Implementing the SEC Market-Risk
Disclosure Rules, BANK ACCT. & FIN., Oct. 11, 1997, at *1, *3, available in 1997 WL
22656646.
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C. Are Derivatives Riskier than Other Investments?
The problem with attempting to answer this question is that
there are as many opinions as there are experts. Some experts
answer this question in the context of a portfolio. 185 Because
derivatives are used most often to hedge existing portfolio risk,
they usually function "to reduce rather than increase risk."186
Conversely, even if risky derivatives positions are taken in the
context of a portfolio, these positions will be hedged by some
other offsetting position in the underlying asset or pooled with
very low risk investments. 8 ' Others argue that the derivatives
do not create risk, but rather the "speculative impulse" of inves-
tors creates the risk.88 Still others say that derivatives are less
risky than other types of investment instruments. 189 A managing
director at Bankers Trust stated: "[P]eople lost a lot more money
in the two-year Treasury note than they ever did in" deriva-
tives."' Probably the most accurate answer to this question is
that derivatives can neither create nor destroy risk, they can
only transfer existing risk from one investor to another.
D. Complexity of Derivatives
Much of the negative coverage regarding derivatives can be
traced to general confusion surrounding the complexities associ-
ated with most derivative transactions.' 9' The complicated na-
ture of certain derivatives is amplified by the use of deficient
risk measurement mechanisms, 9 ' inadequate risk management
controls,'93 and often a poor understanding of the role deriva-
tives play in investment strategies.'9 The mixture of these ingre-
dients frequently leads to the misuse of derivatives, which in
turn can result in significant losses. This is not to say, however,
185. See Frankel, supra note 159, at 306-09.
186. Id. at 301.
187. See id.
188. See, e.g., Muehring, supra note 1, at 31.
189. See id. at 32.
190. Id. (quoting Lisa Posky, one of the managing directors at Bankers Trust).
191. See Frankel, supra note 159, at 299, 304.
192. See id. at 305-06.
193. See id. at 306-07.
194. See id. at 306.
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that all derivatives are complicated. In fact, virtually all ex-
change-traded derivatives and many OTC derivatives are rela-
tively straight-forward and do not pose the danger of unmanage-
able complexity. The most complicated derivatives tend to be
customized OTC derivatives, frequently consisting of a combina-
tion of several derivatives that are often hypersensitive to
changes in the underlying market.
195
Many factors contribute to the complexity of these derivatives.
First, many of the derivatives are customized to the needs of the
individual investor and have never been tested outside the con-
fines of a hypothetical model. The performance of these deriva-
tives in the real market is established only after they have been
incorporated into the particular portfolio. Second, statements
and recommendations made by brokers can both inadvertently
and intentionally mislead investors. An investor can be misled
inadvertently when an investment model incorrectly predicts a
derivative's effect on a portfolio in a specific scenario or when a
broker makes recommendations without essential financial infor-
mation. Investors may also be intentionally misled by brokers.'96
Because derivatives result in a zero-sum scenario an ironic rela-
tionship can develop between brokers and investors. For exam-
ple, when an investor is attempting to reduce risk in a portfolio
through the use of derivatives, she transfers that risk to a party
who is willing to accept it. A broker usually accepts the risk of
such an investor and accordingly hedges against it; however, if
the broker fails to hedge or inadequately hedges the risk she
becomes exposed to market risk. As a result, any losses expe-
rienced on the contract by the investor will mean a gain for the
broker. In other words, if the broker "steers" the investor into a
losing position, she might receive a gain of the equivalent amount.'
195. See Chris Knap, Orange County's Financial Crisis, Next Year's Problem: Hayes
Begins Work on O.C. Portfolio, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Dec. 14, 1994, at *1, *82,
available in 1994 WL 4668898.
196. See generally Craig & Hume, supra note 4 (discussing various large derivatives
losses); Goldman, supra note 40 (discussing the misrepresentation and high-pressure
tactics of some brokers).
197. The intentional deception on the part of the brokers for Bankers Trust was
discovered on taped conversations kept by Bankers Trust. See Craig & Hume, supra
note 4, at 172. This deception contributed to two of the most highly publicized deriv-
atives losses: Gibson Greetings and Proctor & Gamble. See id. at 170-73, 176-79
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Confusing documentation, faulty disclosure of risks, and un-
derdeveloped accounting considerations also add to the complexi-
ty of derivatives. 98 Each of these deficiencies contributes to other
obstacles, such as valuation difficulty and risk determination.'99
These complexities also become amplified by inadequate internal
management controls.
E. Misuse of Derivatives: "Derivatives Don't Blow Up Companies,
People Do"
Although the complexity of derivatives contributes to their
misuse, it is misuse rather than any inherent quality of deriva-
tives that causes major losses.200 According to Richard Breeden,
the former chairman of the SEC and current chairman of the
International Financial Services Group at Coopers & Lybrand:
"Derivatives are like a high-performance automobile. They're
just great, until you see one being driven at 100 miles an hour
by a drunken teenager."20 ' Although misuse of derivatives is
most often associated with the complexity of derivatives, com-
plexity is not a necessary element. Often the misuse of deriva-
tives is the result of a "can't-lose mentality" which fails to con-
sider the downside of the investment.20 2 To demonstrate how the
improper use of derivatives, rather than derivatives themselves,
has caused many of the most catastrophic derivatives losses, this
(providing a complete explanation of all of the pertinent financial transactions and
deception leading up to both Gibson Greetings' and Proctor & Gamble's losses).
198. See Manning, supra note 41, at 18. It is not unusual for resolution of docu-
mentation issues to require six months or more arid to lack clarification of material
exposures. See id.
199. See Baird et al., supra note 137, at 301-02.
200. See Loomis, supra note 4, at 50. See generally Using Derivatives: What Senior
Managers Must Know, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 33 (presenting the opin-
ions of eight practitioners and experts concerning the prevention of derivative mis-
use) [hereinafter Using Derivatives].
201. Derivatives Reconsidered, supra note 56, at *2. Another senior executive color-
fully remarked: "It's not derivatives that blow up companies, it's people who blow up
companies." Id. Coopers & Lybrand is now Pricewaterhouse Coopers.
202. Muebring, supra note 1, at 33. Muehring explains how the early and mid
1990s offered low inflation, a conveniently steep yield curve and low volatilities
which spurred investors to take on large amounts of risk. See id. Because deriva-
tives enabled these types of investments to be accomplished with a minimal amount
of expense, they were used most frequently. See id.
20001
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Article reviews three of the most famous cases: Orange County,
Gibson Greetings, and Barings. Recent cases stemming from the
Asian currency crisis of 1997-1998 will be discussed as well.
1. The Bankruptcy of Orange County
The true reason for the bankruptcy of Orange Couity was the
misuse of highly leveraged government securities"' used for
speculation. These securities were tied to a particular form of
derivative known as highly structured notes. Thus, the value of
the securities would fall as interest rates rose and vice versa.
Orange County borrowed money to invest in the structured
notes. When the interest rates increased, the payments to the
owners decreased much more quickly. For example, if interest
rates went up one percent, interest payments on the structured
notes could go down by three percent." As long as interest rates
fell earnings on the county's bonds rose. For at least two years,
Orange County received an 8.5% return on its investments at a
time when bond mutual funds averaged earnings of only about
7%.20 Problems began to occur in 1994 when the Federal Re-
serve raised interest rates six times in one year." 6 Each increase
in interest rates caused the earnings on the bonds and the mar-
ket value of the securities to drop.2 °7
Several other factors contributed to the massive losses in-
curred by Orange County. First, the county had borrowed a sig-
nificant amount of money to purchase its investments, a strategy
known as leveraging."'° In fact, because such a large portion of
203. See Derivative Financial Investments Relating to Banks and Financial Institu-
tions: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
104th Cong. 37 (1995) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Alan Greenspan,
Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System); Loomis, supra note 4, at
54.
204. See PHILLIPE JORION, BIG BETS GONE BAD: DERIVATiVES AND BANKRUPTCY IN
ORANGE COUNTY 23 (1995).
205. See Welsh, supra note 161, at F3.
206. See Jeff Brazil, Merrill Lynch Says It Told Citron of Risk, L.A. TIEs, Jan.
11, 1995, at Al.
207. See id. At one point, Merrill Lynch predicted that each one percent increase in
interest rates would reduce the value of the county's fund by about $270 million.
See id.
208. See id.
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the fund had been leveraged, Orange County had increased its
market risk exposure significantly. 2 9 As long as interest rates
continued to fall, the county's fund received a substantial rate of
return.2 0 According to Alan Greenspan, Orange County should
have put these substantial returns into an escrow account for "a
rainy day."2 11 Unfortunately, it did not, and soon the flash floods
began. If not for the substantial leveraging, the Orange County
losses would have been reduced greatly.2' According to David
Jones, the chief economist at Aubrey G. Lanston Inc. in New
York, "'Orange County is an example of a big leveraged bet gone
wrong.'
213
A second factor contributing to Orange County's predicament
was its speculative investment strategy.2 4 Edwin G. McKeever,
the cash manager in the treasury department of the Port Au-
thority in New York, views Orange County as a classic example
of the improper use of derivatives. 2" A prudent strategy for Or-
ange County would have been to hedge its risk with an interest
rate swap because of the degree of interest rate market risk to
which Orange County had exposed itself. Instead, Orange Coun-
ty borrowed short and lent long.2 6 According to Alan Greenspan,
this is "a terrific operation if the yield curve is steeply sloping,
because what you do is rake in a very large difference."217 Or-
ange County purchased long-term thirty-year treasuries on lev-
erage with cash from short-term loans through repurchase
209. For a complete explanation of leveraging and how it affects risk, see Richard
Baker, Don't Demonize Derivatives, ROLL CALL, Mar. 27, 1995, passim, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Rollcl File; Frankel, supra note 159, at 323-26.
210. See Hearings, supra note 203, at 37.
211. Id.
212. See Baker, supra note 209.
213. Portia Richardson, Leverage Key to Losses, FUTURES, Feb. 1995, at 12 (blaming
high leverage for losses of Orange County, California).
214. See Baker, supra note 209; Brazil, supra note 206, at Al.
215. See Richardson, supra note 213, at 14.
216. See Brazil, supra note 206, at Al. According to documents as far back as
1992, even Merrill Lynch, Orange County's own broker, had been warning the coun-
ty treasurer about the risky nature of the county's portfolio and suggesting that he
reassess his long-standing strategy of betting that interest rates would remain low
or fall. See id. "We suggest that Orange County constantly review the volatility in
the existing portfolio," wrote one official at Merrill Lynch. Id. (quoting Michael G.
Stamerson of Merrill Lynch).
217. Hearings, supra note 203, at 37.
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agreements."'8 This left the county highly vulnerable to increas-
es in short-term interest rates.21 9 When short-term interest rates
rose, the county had to borrow at higher rates while still lending
at lower long-term rates. Greenspan believes that the use of de-
rivatives is relevant only because of their cost effectiveness. If
Orange County used "no derivatives, but insisted upon the same
strategy... [it] would have come up with the same problem[,]
[ilt just would have cost.., a little more."22°
The final factor contributing to Orange County's bankruptcy
was the county's insistence on holding its investments contrary
to the professional advice it received. 21 In fact, when Orange
County's own broker offered to buy back all of the derivative
securities it had sold to the county because of concern for the
stability of the portfolio, the county's treasurer refused to sell. 22
2
Apparently, politics interfered with investment judgment.
Although Orange County lost almost $2 billion, requiring it to
layoff hundreds of employees as well as make cuts in health,
police, and education programs, Acting Treasury Secretary
Frank N. Newman said the administration saw no need for any
major legislation on derivatives.2 23 The committee determined
that it was the risky nature of the strategy pursued by Orange
County rather than the instruments themselves that caused the
loss.2 4 In fact, Orange County could have reduced or even elim-
inated the amount of interest rate risk significantly with a rela-
tively simple interest rate swap.225 Moreover, had Orange Coun-
ty held onto the derivatives in its portfolio, it would have re-
couped not only its full $21 billion value, but also $300 million
218. See Richardson, supra note 213, at 12.
219. See Hearings, supra note 203, at 15 (statement of Frank N. Newman, Acting
Secretary of the U.S. Dept. of Treasury). In fact, officials at Merrill Lynch had
warned Orange County's treasurer about the increased level of risk exposure; Brazil,
supra note 206, at Al.
220. Hearings, supra note 203, at 37.
221. See Baker, supra note 209, at *3.
222. See Brazil, supra note 206, at Al.
223. See Derivatives Debacle; Orange County Woes Unlikely to Spur U.S. Action,
INS. ACCT., Jan. 16, 1995, at *1, available in LEXIS, Market & Industry Library,
Insurance File.
224. Id.
225. See Richardson, supra note 213, at 14.
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in interest.226 Orange County argued that its broker, Merrill
Lynch, failed to warn the county about the risk surrounding the
investments and therefore should assume liability.227 Merrill has
paid over $437 million in settlements over numerous suits con-
cerning this matter, but remains steadfast in its position that it
committed no wrong and acted professionally in its dealings with
the county.228 Although the brokerage firm sold billions of dollars
worth in securities to the county, it maintains that the county
made its own sophisticated investment decisions.229
2. Gibson Greetings
Gibson Greetings involved a different set of issues relating to
derivatives: the deception and misrepresentation of derivatives'
performance and valuation. In 1991, Gibson Greetings, a region-
al greeting card company, issued "$50 million [of] senior notes
with an interest rate of 9.33%."230 Within months, interest rates
began to fall. Because the notes could not be prepaid, Gibson
was left with an increasing interest rate deficit.231 "In November
1991, Gibson entered into an interest rate swap" with Bankers
Trust on $30 million of notes in order to reduce the effective in-
terest rate of the notes.23 2 Over the next two and one-half years,
Gibson entered into twenty-nine increasingly complex deriva-
tives transactions with Bankers Trust.233 Many contained lever-
226. See Rita Koselka, If You Can't Stand the Heat .... FORBES, Feb. 12, 1996,
at 37.
227. See Brazil, supra note 206, at Al.
228. See Andy Pasztor et al., Merrill Lynch to Pay 473.1 Million to Resolve Claims
by Orange County, WALL ST. J., June 3, 1998, at A3.
229. See id.
230. Baird et al., supra note 137, at 314.
231. See Craig & Hume, supra note 4, at 170.
232. Baird et al., supra note 137, at 314.
233. See Craig & Hume, supra note 4, at 170. All of the derivatives were OTC and
customized. "They included 'derivatives sometimes described as the ratio swap, peri-
odic floor, spread lock 1 and 2, Treasury-linked swap, knockout call option, LIBOR-
linked payout, time swap and wedding band 3 and 6." See id.
Gary Gastineau, head of derivatives research at S.G. Warburg, says that
given long enough, he might be able to think of a risk management rea-
son for entering into a wedding band swap: "But that's not really their
purpose. These things are done by people who think they know better
than the market where interest rates are headed.
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age factors that caused a dramatic increase in Gibson's losses
because of interest rate hypersensitivity.2 '
Although the initial interest rate swap had improved Gibson's
financial situation, Gibson had engaged in so many subsequent
derivatives transactions that it could no longer determine
whether it was making or losing money. 35 This situation arose
for three reasons. First, each of the new derivatives transactions
was linked to the previous one, making it difficult to determine
the effect of the transaction.23 Second, Bankers Trust refused to
allow Gibson access to the proprietary valuation models. 3 '
Third, Bankers Trust employees began to lie to Gibson about the
amount it was losing. 8 Near the end of a series of significant
losses reaching a total of $17.5 million, Bankers Trust informed
Gibson that the losses were "potentially without limit" and that
it should enter two more derivatives transactions in order to cap
the loss at $27.5 million and potentially reduce the loss to $3
million.2 39 As it turned out, Gibson reported losses of $20.7 mil-
lion, while Bankers Trust reported gains of $13 million.2' °
Fortunately for Gibson Greetings, a tape of an incriminating
phone conversation was uncovered during discovery in a lawsuit
initiated by Gibson alleging fiduciary duty violations." 1 Bankers
Trust eventually reached a settlement with Gibson pursuant to
which Gibson paid $6.2 million or 30% of the amount that Bank-
er's was owed from the derivatives transactions. 42
3. Barings Bank
Even Barings, the venerable 234 year-old British bank was
not immune to the misuse of derivatives. Nicholas Leeson, "one
of4its traders in Singapore... bought thousands of exchange-
Loomis, supra note 4, at 54.
234. See Baird et al., supra note 137, at 315.
235. See Loomis, supra note 4, at 58.
236. See id.
237. See Craig & Hume, supra note 4, at 171.
238. See Loomis, supra note 4, at 58.
239. Id. at 59.
240. See Craig & Hume, supra note 4, at 170.
241. See id.; Loomis, supra note 4, at 58-59.
242. See Loomis, supra note 4, at 59-60.
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traded futures contracts[,] based on the Nikkei Average and
traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Leeson bought these con-
tracts... believing the Nikkei would rise."' He took these
positions without hedging, hoping to maximize his gain, but also
exposing himself to the potential for a huge loss.' "When the
Nikkei [index] fell and the contracts became due... Barings
could not cover the losses ... and collapsed." 5
The obvious cause of this disaster was the speculative strate-
gy employed by Leeson. Both Leeson and Barings, however,
share responsibility for the loss. Leeson hid the existence of
many of these types of trades from his superiors, but Barings
did not possess adequate management controls to prevent this
type of activity.' "As Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Chairman Mary Schapiro put it: There was a near total failure
of internal controls. Illogical lines of supervision, and a trader
permitted to control the settlement and accounting for his own
trades, is a recipe for disaster."' 7 The Barings case particularly
highlights the dangers of operational risk.
4. Asian Currency Crisis
Derivatives contracts are used regularly by Southeast Asian
companies to bet on interest rate and currency movement.m
Although their governments continued to insist that their cur-
rencies would hold against the dollar in the early weeks of the
Asian currency crisis, many believe that banks and other invest-
ment companies doubled their holdings of speculative currency
derivatives, hoping to make huge profits. 9 Instead, losses lurk
on their books as the speculators wait for the maturity of these
contracts.25 °
243. Baker, supra note 209, at *3.
244. See id.
245. Id.
246. See id. at *1-2; David Nusbaum, Are Your Internal Controls a Match for Oper-
ations Risk?, FUTURES, June 1995, at 62.
247. Nusbaum, supra note 246, at 62.
248. See Richard Borsuk & Darren McDermott, Indonesian Bank Faces Currency
Losses, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1998, at A15.
249. See id.
250. See id.
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Bank Ekspor Impor Indonesia recently announced losses from
currency speculation that could total several hundred million
dollars.25' So far, the bank has made its payments on the con-
tracts already due;25 2 but this is just one bank, in one country, in
a region that potentially is saturated with contracts of this sort.
The international banks who hold the winning side of these con-
tracts may face huge losses as the Asian counterparties default
on their payments under the contracts.
One example is J.P. Morgan & Co. which is fighting that very
battle in Manhattan and Korean courts.253 In February 1998,
Morgan filed suit against SK Securities and another Korean
investment company for $300 million owed on derivatives con-
tracts.21 SK Securities has filed a counter-suit alleging that
Morgan "failed to inform [them] of the risks involved."2 5
The transactions involved the exchange of U.S. dollars for
Southeast Asian currencies between Morgan and SK 25 6 The
deals were complex derivatives primarily entered as speculation
in Asian currencies.251 In February of 1997 SK bet that the Thai
baht would rise against the dollar. They lost their bet, and by
the summer of 1997 SK was facing loses of $300 million on one
transaction and $189 million on a second. 8 One of Korea's larg-
est banks, Housing & Commercial Bank, guaranteed the pay-
ments.25 9 After the currency collapse, SK was unable to make
the payments due under the swaps. Housing & Commercial
Bank also refused to pay, claiming their liability was limited to
$100 million,26° and the contracts were altered to delete this
clause without their consent.26' Morgan now faces losses close to
$500 million on theoretically winning contracts.262
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See Frank, supra note 26, at B25.
254. See id.
255. Id.
256. See id.
257. See O'Brien, supra note 25, at D1.
258. See id.
259. See Frank, supra note 26, at B25.
260. See id.
261. See OBrien, supra note 25, at D1.
262. See id.
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The recent plummet of the Russian ruble adds to the intense
concern over the Asian currency crisis. Foreign lenders risk los-
ing more than $10 billion worth of currency agreements they
purchased from the Russian banks to guard against ruble deval-
uation.263 One American bank, Republic New York Corporation,
reported losses that will erase all of its third-quarter earnings.26 4
Investors fear the sudden and extreme devaluation of the ruble
may play out in other markets as well, with possible "devalua-
tion of the Venezuelan bolivar or... the Brazilian real."265 Since
the ruble's fall in value, the peso has dropped 8.9% already.266
The scenarios described here demonstrate that derivatives are
not inherent losers, but rather risky investment strategies and
inadequate internal controls lead to loss. The following section
discusses how investors can avoid these types of disasters.
III. NEW CONCEPTUALIZATION OF DERIVATIVES USE
Using derivatives as a hedging device is risky because of the
high level of sophistication necessary for successful investment.267
The problem is exacerbated by the astounding growth of deriva-
tives products and technology, which far outpace management
and investor knowledge, as well as corporate control systems.26
Users lack of knowledge about derivatives and their under-ap-
preciation of the risks involved have led to a majority of the high
profile losses of the 1990s.269 The EPIC control system outlined
below is vital to educate corporate management about
derivatives' form and effectiveness. Without such a system, cor-
porations will expose themselves to liability for both the misuse
of derivatives and the failure to use them as protection against
risk.
263. See Andrews, supra note 30, at D5.
264. See O'Brien, supra note 31, at D6.
265. Sam Dillon, The Hemisphere's Crisis: Even as Latin Markets Plunge, Drastic
Remedies Are Avoided, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1998, at D2.
266. See id.
267. See Suzanne E. Bish, A Guide to Narrow the Derivatives' Understanding Gap
and Reduce Losses: How to Increase Knowledge, Controls, and Reporting, 58 OHIo
ST. L.J. 539, 555 (1997).
268. See id.
269. See id. at 539-41.
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To date, few lawsuits have been filed over losses from deriva-
tives use. Almost all of these have resulted in out-of-court settle-
ments or dismissals for failure to state a cause of action. Of the
lawsuits that have arisen, two general types exist: (1) investors
suing broker-dealers over recommended products that lost mon-
ey or actual sales of derivatives which resulted in losses; and (2)
shareholders suing the corporation over derivatives losses. This
Part examines both scenarios and evaluates a controversial
proposition that directors have a duty to shareholders to investi-
gate how derivatives could affect current business risks of the
corporation, and that directors have a duty to use derivatives if
the level of risk will thereby be reduced.
A. Regulatory Structure Applicable to Derivatives
Derivative type and the class of counterparty involved dictate
(1) the regulatory entity which governs the transaction; (2) lia-
bility of counterparties; and (3) available causes of action.Y
1. Regulatory Entities
The SEC has jurisdiction over the offer and sale of derivatives
that qualify as "securities," via authority of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.1 The Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion (CFTC), pursuant to the Commodities Exchange Act of 1936
(CEA), 72 has exclusive jurisdiction over futures and oversees the
trading of other derivatives that constitute "commodities," such
as commodity options. 3
If all derivatives fell neatly into one of two categories, securi-
ties or commodities, then determining which rules to apply to a
given derivatives transaction would be fairly straightforward.
Because some derivatives have characteristics common to both
270. See generally Ernest T. Patrikis & Diane L. Virzera, Over-the-Counter Deriva-
tives Sales Practices: Disclosure, Suitability, Appropriateness, and 'Best Practices," in
MANAGING RISK EXPOSURE IN DERIVATIVES 1995, at 505 (PLI Corp. L. and Prac.
Course Handbook Series No. B-914, 1995) (discussing the relationship between type
and counterparty class).
271. See Medero et al., supra note 3; Patrikis & Virzera, supra note 270, at 507.
272. 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
273. See Patrikis & Virzera, supra note 270, at 507.
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securities and commodities, 274 it is difficult to determine which
set of rules and standards apply to these derivatives transac-
tions.275
Furthermore, a large portion of the derivatives market con-
sists of OTC instruments, such as forwards, swaps, and many
options contracts, that are not directly subject to either securi-
ties or commodities laws.276 For example, regulation over the
options market is split three ways: (1) the SEC maintains juris-
diction over currency options traded on securities exchanges and
all options on securities; 277 (2) the CFTC has exclusive authority
over futures on groups of securities, options on those futures,
and options on foreign currency that are traded on a securities
exchange;278 and (3) the remaining options are regulated only
indirectly by the SEC, CFTC, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency and Federal Reserve, through agency control over the
counterparties that sell the derivatives.2 79 The Supreme Court
has further clarified that foreign currency options not traded on
a board of trade are exempt from CFTC regulation.2 0 In inter-
preting the statute that created the CFTC, the Court gave the
274. See id. at 507-08.
275. See Medero et al., supra note 3. The classification given to the instrument
determines if, how, and by whom the instrument is regulated, and even whether it
can be offered at all.
276. See Patrikis & Virzera, supra note 270, at 507-08 (stating that although OTC
derivatives are not governed directly by the SEC or the CFTC, and banks make up
a large portion of the OTC derivative market dealers, OTC transactions where a
bank is a counterparty are subject to the regulations imposed on banks by the OCC
and the Federal Reserve). In addition, OTC derivatives are subject to indirect regu-
lation by all of the regulatory entities through agency control theories. See id.
277. See Susan C. Ervin, OTC Derivative Markets and Their Regulation: Working
Paper on Commodity Futures Trading Commission Regulatory Framework, C882 ALI-
ABA 97, 101-02 (1994).
278. See id.
279. See Goldman, supra note 40, at 1121; see also Markey Introduces Derivatives
Bill; SEC Would Oversee Unregulated Dealers, 64 BANKING REP. (BNA) 471, 471
(Mar. 6, 1995), available in LEXIS, Banking Library, Bnabnk File ("Rep. Edward
Markey (D-Mass.) ... introduced a bill [Derivatives Dealers Act of 1994, H.R. 10631
that would bring currently unregulated derivatives dealers affiliated with securities
or insurance firms under the regulatory oversight of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.").
280. See Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 519 U.S. 465, 478-79
(1997).
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language its plain meaning, but recognized the policy debate
underlying its decision:
[P]etitioners, their amici, and the Treasury Department,
argue that if off-exchange foreign currency options are not
treated as exempt from CEA regulation, the increased costs
associated with unnecessary regulation of the highly sophisti-
cated OTC foreign currency markets might well drive this
business out of the United States. The [CFTC] responds that
to the extent limited exemptions from regulation are neces-
sary, it will provide them, but argues that options are partic-
ularly susceptible to fraud and abuse if not carefully po-
liced .... [T]hese are arguments best addressed to the Con-
gress, not the courts.28'
Currently, the regulatory scheme for swaps and more "exotic
instruments" is the most confused.282 Technically, swaps could
fall under CFTC jurisdiction by virtue of the CEA rule that all
futures contracts must be traded on an exchange.83 However,
CFTC has exempted swap transactions between "eligible swap
participants" 2  from all CEA provisions, (with the exception of
the antifraud rules), including the exchange trading require-
ment.2 Although swaps have been excluded from CFTC juris-
diction and have never been considered securities subject to the
SEC, the SEC decided recently that a swap agreement contain-
ing "embedded options" may be subject to SEC jurisdiction due
to the existence of options qualifying as securities. 86 It is un-
281. Id. at 479-80 (citations omitted).
282. See Goldman, supra note 40, at 1120.
283. See id.
284. An "eligible swap participant" is a bank, investment company, commodity pool
with assets exceeding $5 million, corporation or other business with assets exceeding
$10 million, ERISA employee benefit plan with assets over $5 million, any govern-
mental entity, broker-dealer, and any natural person with assets over $10 million.
See 17 C.F.R. § 35.1 (1999).
285. See Goldman, supra note 40, at 1120. This was due largely to intense lobbying
by the ABA and national and regional banks. The CFTC limited the exclusion to
credit-worthy participants in order to provide greater certainty about the enforceability
of OTC swap agreements. See id.
286. Id. at 1121; see Gibson Greetings v. Bankers Trust Co., No. C-1-94-620 (S.D.
Ohio Sept. 12, 1994). In one of the most celebrated cases in derivatives litigation,
the SEC asserted jurisdiction over the derivatives transactions involved between Gib-
son Greetings and Bankers Trust, by classifying a swap and a call option as options
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clear whether the courts will uphold the SEC's determination
that swaps containing embedded options are securities.2"7 If they
do, it is equally unclear what effect the SEC's expanded juris-
diction is likely to have on the swap market.
Securities broker-dealers are subject to SEC regulation and at
least one self-regulatory organization (SRO) such as a stock
exchange or the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD).28 Although the SEC has the authority to regulate the
conduct of broker-dealers directly, an SRO typically will initiate
regulatory actions pursuant to its own rules and enforcement
proceedings.289 The CFTC regulates futures commission mer-
chants, which include floor brokers, commodity trading advisors,
and commodity pool operators.2 0 The Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC) regulates national banks dealing in de-
rivatives, whereas the Federal Reserve regulates bank holding
companies and state-chartered member banks. 29' Although
banks often are considered to be more heavily regulated than
other types of derivatives dealers, bank regulation typically en-
sures the safety and soundness of the bank, rather than the
investor.292
on securities and thus, securities. See id This conclusion is somewhat justifiable
with respect to the call option, which is at least in the form of an option, but the
swap is more difficult to explain. The SEC's finding that a swap is in fact an option
raises the possibility of a broader jurisdiction for the SEC. Previously, swaps had
not been classified as securities by the SEC and the SEC provided no basis for
changing its position. See Romano, supra note 46, at 58.
287. See Goldman, supra note 40, at 1121.
288. See id. at 1122.
289. See id. at 1121 n.45.
290. See Ervin, supra note 277, at 112-13 (discussing the regulation of market par-
ticipants); see also Craig & Hume, supra note 4, at 173-74. In its regulatory enforce-
ment against Bankers Trust, the CFTC based its order for sanctions on a finding
that Bankers Trust's fiduciary relationship with Gibson made it a "commodity trad-
ing advisor' over which the CFTC had jurisdiction." Id. The fact that the actual
derivative products at issue were not commodities was not relevant. See id. The
CFTC found Bankers Trust "in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 60(1)(A), which simply prohib-
its any commodities trading advisor from employing 'any device, scheme or artifice
to defraud any client or participant or prospective client or participant.'" Id. at 174-
75 (quoting Joanne Medero, OTC Derivatives After Bankers Trust-Compliance Issues,
95 SIA COMPLIANCE & LEGAL NEWS & NOTES 1, *16 (1995)).
291. See Patrikis & Virzera, supra note 270, at 508.
292. See Goldman, supra note 40, at 1122.
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2. Broker-Dealer Liability
Most investor lawsuits arise from losses on derivatives recom-
mended or sold by a broker-dealer. Scarcity of judicial guidance,
patchwork regulation, and unclear classification of derivatives
make it difficult to predict ultimate liability for losses and even
the appropriate cause of action to test liability.293 The legal
claims that have been made by investors against broker-dealers
can be "grouped into three broad categories: suitability, authori-
zation, and disclosure claims."294 These three types of claims
have been referred to as the "'SAD' phenomenon of litigation
over derivatives losses."295
a. Authority Claims
There are two causes of action that fall under the heading of
"authority" claims: (1) those alleging that the disputed transac-
tions were ultra vires;2 9' and (2) those claiming that investment
in derivatives was never authorized or, if personnel did commit
to the transaction, they did not have proper authority to do so.
2 97
i. Ultra Vires
Ultra vires claims are most commonly filed by the government
using a specific statute that prohibits the transaction at issue.298
They can also be made by a corporation relying on specific arti-
cles of incorporation or bylaws prohibiting the transaction.2 99 In
293. See generally Teigland, supra note 1, at *1 (discussing the limited case law
and lack of judicial guidance).
294. Id. at *3.
295. Id.; see also Holding, supra note 13, at Al (noting the influx of derivatives lit-
igation in Orange County).
296. See generally Charles v. Town of Jeanerette, Inc., 234 So.2d 794, 798 (La. Ct.
App. 1970) (defining ultra vires as acts beyond the powers conferred upon a munici-
pality by law); State ex rel. v. Holston Trust Co., 79 S.W.2d 1012, 1016 (Tenn. 1935)
(referring to ultra vires as acts beyond the scope of incorporation); Haslund v. City
of Seattle, 547, P.2d 1221, 1230 (Wash. 1976) (defining ultra vires as acts
"performed without any authority to act on the subject"); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1522 (6th ed. 1990) (defining ultra vires as "an act performed without any authority
to act on [the] subject").
297. See Teigland, supra note 1, at *7.
298. See id. at *8.
299. See id.; see also Holding, supra note 13, at Al ("[Dierivatives can be so diffi-
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the most famous case of this type, the British House of Lords
ruled that the boroughs of Hammersmith and Fulham should
not bear losses from interest-rate swaps °.3 ' The boroughs argued
the investments were impermissible under borough rules, and
the House of Lords agreed."' 1 The brokers were forced to absorb
more than $70 million in losses.30 2 In Orange County's suit
against Merrill Lynch, the county asserted an ultra vires claim,
alleging that "[any County debts or liabilities incurred in viola-
tion of... [cionstitutional and statutory provisions are ultra
vires and therefore void."303 Specifically, it alleged that the Cali-
fornia Constitution explicitly barred the reverse repurchase
agreements. ° In addition, California law prohibits counties from
taking on more annual debt than revenues generated without
approval of two-thirds of the voters.0 5 Orange County alleged
that Merrill Lynch knew or should have known this. 3 6 West
Virginia made a similar allegation against Morgan Stanley,
arguing that speculation transactions should be invalidated
because speculation with state funds is prohibited and Morgan
Stanley knowingly enabled speculation in violation of the law.0 7
cult to understand and describe that even a large company or sophisticated county
can rarely be sure whether the law or internal policies authorize it to invest in
them.").
300. See Hazell v. Hammersmith & Fulham London Borough Council, 2 Q.B. 697,
697 (Eng. C.A. 1992); Holding, supra note 13, at *2.
301. See Hazell, 2 Q.B. at 698-99.
302. See Holding, supra note 13, at *2.
303. Orange County Sues Merrill Lynch, Says Firm Breached Fiduciary Duty, 64
BANKING REP. (BNA) 192, (Jan. 23, 1995), at *2, available in LEXIS, Banking Li-
brary, Bnabnk File.
Under Article XVI, Section 18 of the state constitution, no county "shall
incur any indebtedness or liability in any manner or for any purpose
exceeding in any year the income and revenue provided for that year"
without a two-thirds majority vote by residents, in an election held for
that purpose, the lawsuit asserted.
Id. (quoting CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 18).
304. See id.
305. See supra note 303.
306. See Craig & Hume, supra note 4, at 183; Dominic Bencivenga, Derivatives Lit-
igation: Suits Claim Higher Suitability Standards Apply, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 16, 1995, at 5.
307. See State v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 459 S.E.2d 906, 912-13 (W. Va. 1995).
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ii. Unauthorized Transactions
Investors can also attempt to invalidate transactions by alleg-
ing that, although the company may have had the legal capacity
to undertake the transactions in question, the officer(s) that
committed the company to the transaction did not have the au-
thority to do so. 308 Orange County used this claim against
Merrill Lynch, asserting that the county treasurer never had the
authority to enter into the derivatives transactions."0 9 The OCC
requires that banks trading in derivatives confirm that the coun-
terparty has the legal authority to enter into derivatives
transactions.310
3. Corporate Liability and Fiduciary Duty Connected with
Derivatives
A corporation must tread cautiously when considering wheth-
er to sue a broker-dealer over a losing derivative. Allegations
that a corporate investor was not authorized or sophisticated
enough to enter into a particular derivatives transaction gives
shareholders ammunition for lawsuits against the corporation. 1
Although no shareholder lawsuit involving derivatives has yet
been decided, there are several which are currently pending or
have been settled out of court.3 '2
Judicial precedent in lawsuits by shareholders against direc-
tors generally is rare, and not surprisingly there is a dearth of
precedent specifically in the derivatives area.13 Several formida-
308. See Craig S. Smith & Sara Webb, Chinese Company Threatens to Sue Lehman
Brothers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 1994, available in 1994 WL-WSJ 2057248; Teigland,
supra note 1, at *7.
309. See Craig & Hume, supra note 4, at 183.
310. See Patrikis & Virzera, supra note 270, at 516.
311. See generally Teigland, supra note 1, at *7 (explaining that shareholders may
sue on the basis of unauthorized transactions).
312. See infra notes 248-50 and accompanying text.
313. See Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the
Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968)
("The search for cases in which directors of industrial corporations have been held
liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing is a search for
a very small number of needles in a very large haystacl"); see also 1 DENNIS J.
BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CoRPORATE DI-
RECTORS 167-72 (5th ed. 1998) (identifying only twelve modem cases as finding ac-
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ble obstacles exist for shareholders wishing to sue directors.
First, the shareholder must overcome the "business judgment
rule," which provides significant protection to directors and offi-
cers acting within their authority who enter into a transaction
in good faith and with due care.314 Second, a shareholder has
little personal incentive to initiate this type of suit because she
is responsible for her legal expenses if she loses, and does not
receive any direct recovery if she wins.315 A shareholder sues on
behalf of the corporation for injury to the corporation, and any
recovery reimburses this injury.316 Third, in cases when the
shareholder is suing as an individual or as part of a class action,
she has to prove some direct loss of shareholder value.1
a. The Business Judgment Rule Generally
The business judgment rule is a formidable barrier to share-
holder-plaintiffs. The rule provides the following:
[Tihat [because] it is both the duty and the right of.the board
of directors to manage the affairs of the corporation, courts
will defer to business decisions made by the board of direc-
tors, as long as in making those decisions the directors com-
plied with their fiduciary duties of loyalty, due care and good
faith.3 1 8
tionable director negligence without a concurrent breach of loyalty or conflict of in-
terest).
314. See 1 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 313, at 40.
315. Cf. id. at 76-77 (stating that the burden of proof on the plaintiff-shareholder is
high).
316. See 1 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 313, at 1380-81.
317. See generally In re Piper Funds, Inc. Institutional Gov't Income Portfolio Litig.,
71 F.3d 298, 299-304 (8th Cir. 1995) (discussing general class action rules as applied
to securities litigation and stating that the shares involved lost over 20% of the val-
ue due to derivatives investments), cert. denied sub nom. Savoie v. Rodney, 119 S.
Ct. 805 (1999). This is often not easy to prove. For example, although Procter &
Gamble lost millions of dollars due to derivatives, during the weeks that followed
the announcement, the price of its stock outperformed the market.
318. RALPH C. FERRARA BT AL., SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION: BESIEGING
THE BOARD § 5.01 (1996). See generally Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984) (stating that the rule presumes informed business decisions); 1 BLOCK ET AL.,
supra note 313, at 40-43 (stating that the protections of the rule will not apply
when the director or officer is interested, did not actually make a decision, made an
uninformed decision, or was grossly negligent).
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The rule protects directors who have, in diligently performing
each of these duties, made honest errors of judgment."
In a treatise entitled Shareholder Derivative Litigation: Be-
sieging the Board,32° the authors set out five rationales for the
business judgment rule. First, the business judgment rule limits
a court's ability to substitute its own judgment for that of the
board, thereby reinforcing the board's duty and right to manage
the affairs of the corporation. 21 Second, the business judgment
rule acknowledges that corporate boards of directors are gen-
erally better qualified to make business decisions than are
courts. 22 Third, courts will not hold directors to a standard of
knowing hindsight information."2 Fourth, directors must be free
to take risks that are ultimately in the best interests of the cor-
poration.324 For this reason, no liability exists for decisions made
in accordance with a director's fiduciary duties that, for whatev-
er reason, prove to be wrong. 25 Fifth, the business judgment
rule creates a degree of certainty and consistency in applying
liability for directors.326
The business judgment rule functions as both a procedural
rule and a substantive rule. As a procedural rule, it creates "a
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of
a corporation acted on an informed basis [duty of due care], in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in
the best interests of the company [duty of loyalty] ."327 This pre-
sumption puts the burden on the shareholder to prove that the
board breached one of its three fiduciary duties: due care, good
faith, or loyalty.3 28 As a substantive rule, if the shareholder fails
to rebut the presumption and there is some rational business
319. See FERRARA ET AL., supra note 318, § 5.01.
320. Id.
321. See id. § 5.02.
322. See id.
323. See id.
324. See id.
325. See Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051-52 (Del. Ch. 1996).
326. See FERRARA ET AL., supra note 318, § 5.02.
327. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
328. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Aronson, 473 A.2d
at 812; FERRARA ET AL., supra note 318, at § 5.01.
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purpose for the decision, the business judgment rule shields the
directors from liability.
3 29
b. Fiduciary Duties of Directors
In exercising the duty of loyalty, a corporate director must
never use her office to promote, advance, or effectuate a transac-
tion between the corporation and such person that is not sub-
stantively fair to the corporation.3 0 This applies as both "an af-
firmative duty to protect the interests of the corporation and an
obligation to refrain from conduct that would injure the corpora-
tion and its stockholders or deprive them of profit or advantage."31
In order to satisfythe duty of due care, directors must "inform
themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material
information reasonably available to them.33 2 A director must do
more than simply believe that she is acting in the best interest
of the corporation."33 She must act prudently under the circum-
stances and keep informed of all the information she believes in
good faith is material to her decision." In Smith v. Van Gorkom,33 5
the court described the duty of care as requiring directors to
inform themselves of all material information reasonably avail-
able to them, including alternatives, before making a business
decision.336 Fully informed decisions made in good faith and be-
lieved to be in the best interest of the corporation are judged
against a standard of gross negligence.3 Thus, unless the board
of directors breached one of its fiduciary duties, or the decision
329. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971), affd 332 A.2d
139 (Del. 1975); FERRARA ET AL., supra note 318, at § 5.01.
330. See Hall v. Tennessee Dressed Beef Co., No. 01-A-01-9510-CH-00430, 1996 WL
355074, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 1996), rev'd in part, affd in part, 957
S.W.2d 536 (Tenn. 1997).
331. James E. Spiotto, Director and Officer Liability: Who Watches the Watchmen?,
in DERIVATIVES 1996: AvOIDING THE RISK AND MANAGING THE LITIGATION 1996, at
361, 372 (PLI Comm. L. and Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B-931, 1996).
332. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
333. See Kahn v. Roberts, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 674, 683 (Del. Ch. Dec. 6, 1995),
affd, 679 A.2d 460 (Del. 1996).
334. See id.
335. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
336. See id. at 872.
337. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
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in question lacks any rational business purpose, the courts will
not second-guess the decision.3
8
If a shareholder rebuts the business judgment rule by showing
a breach of fiduciary duty, the burden of proof to establish that
the decision at issue satisfied the "entire fairness" standard
shifts from the shareholder to the directors.339 To succeed, the
directors must establish that the transaction was accomplished
by fair dealing and resulted in a fair price for both the corpora-
tion and its shareholders.3 4° The following cases demonstrate
successful shareholder attempts to rebut the business judgment
rule by each of the three available means.
c. Breaching the Duty of Care
In Van Gorkom, the Supreme Court of Delaware found that
the board of directors was grossly negligent in their duty of care
because they failed to act with informed reasonable deliberation
in agreeing to a merger proposal."' Specifically, some of the di-
rectors had conducted a "preliminary study" on the viability of a
leveraged buyout. 42 They did not "'come up' with a price" for the
company but rather simply "ran the numbers" of two somewhat
arbitrary share prices to determine the cash flow needed to ser-
vice the debt that would "probably" be incurred in a leveraged
338. See Kahn, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 684.
339. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1375-76 (Del. 1993); Hall v. Tennessee
Dressed Beef Co., No. 01-A-01-9510-CH-00430, 1996 WL 355074, at *7 (Tenn. App.
June 28, 1996), rev'd in part, affd in part, 957 S.W.2d 536 (Tenn. 1997).
340. See FERRARA ET AL., supra note 318, § 5.01.
341. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 881; In Hoye u. Meek, 795 F.2d 893 (10th Cir.
1986), a bank filed for bankruptcy based on two years of substantial losses resulting
from investment in Government National Mortgage Association certificates (GNMAs).
See id. at 893-95. The bank chairman (1) did not regularly attend board meetings;
(2) failed to preside at board meetings; (3) failed to avert exposure to increasing
indebtedness as a result of the investment in repurchase contracts for GNMAs that
declined in value during periods of rising interest rates; (4) delegated too much au-
thority to his son to make investments and repurchase contracts; and (5) failed to
monitor the investment decisions made by his son. See id. at 896-97. This behavior
led the court to find a breach of the duty of care by failing to make necessary in-
quiries and keep abreast of investments. See id. at 897. The bank chairman was not
entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule despite his good faith. See
id. He was found liable for investment losses incurred by the bank. See id. at 893.
342. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 865.
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buyout."4s Although these computations were not considered
extensive and no conclusion was reached, they became the basis
for what the directors referred to as, in the range of a "fair
price," for the company. 4 The court pointed out that this does
not necessarily equate to the best price.345 The court found that
the business judgment rule did not protect directors who have
not informed themselves of all material information reasonably
available to them prior to making a business decision. 4'
d. Breaching the Duty of Loyalty
In Doyle v. Union Insurance Co.,347 shareholders brought a
class action suit against the directors of a mutual insurance
company for violating their fiduciary duties by selling the assets
of the company to a newly created stock company for less than
fair market value.3 4' The Supreme Court of Nebraska held, inter
alia, that the mutual insurance company president and board
member breached their duty of loyalty by acting in their own
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. See id. at 875-76.
346. See id. at 888-89. By analogy, Paramount Comm. Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.,
637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994), is instructive. Although this case was not brought by
shareholders, but rather by corporations that were tendering offers to merge with
Paramount, the court's decision indicates that this case would have met all of the
necessary requirements to overcome the business judgment rule. See id. In addition,
the court indicated that Paramounts justification for its actions would not have
stood up to the entire fairness standard. See id. The Delaware Supreme Court held
that directors violated their fiduciary duties by favoring the Paramount-Viacom
transaction over the more valuable unsolicited offer of QVC. See id. at 49. Because
Paramount decided to sell control, it was required to act on an informed basis and
to secure the best value reasonably available to the stockholders. See id. Viacom ten-
dered an offer and Paramount conditionally agreed to it. See id. at 50. Paramount
then entered into a "no shop" agreement with Viacom, stating that it would not con-
sider or accept other offers without self-imposed liability. See id. Even after Viacom
made an initial offer, Paramount directors had an obligation to search for the best
value reasonably available to the stockholders among the subsequent offers. See id.
In other words, Paramount had a duty to become fully informed on the alternatives
available. See id. at 51. The court ruled that the Paramount directors' process was
not reasonable, and the result achieved for the stockholders was not reasonable un-
der the circumstances. See id. at 49.
347. 277 N.W.2d 36 (Neb. 1979).
348. See id. at 38.
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self-interest in recommending the deal. 9 Evidence suggested
they both benefited substantially from the deal: each became a
president and received significant salary increases."'
e. Breach of Good Faith
In Geygan v. Queen City Grain Co.,"51 shareholders sought to
hold directors liable for engaging in imprudent grain commodity
trading.352 The Ohio Court of Appeals held that by engaging in
grain market speculation, a violation of state law, the directors
breached their fiduciary duty." Because grain speculation was
imprudent and illegal, the business judgment rule was inappli-
cable to the damages resulting from those transactions. Due to
the position of trust held by the directors, a fiduciary relation-
ship exists between them and the corporation as well as the
shareholders.35 Directors are held strictly accountable and liable
if the corporate funds are wasted or mismanaged.355
The statute that Queen City violated mandated that licensed
handlers purchasing agricultural commodities maintain owner-
ship over ninety percent of the value of the handler's obligations
in the commodity at all times.356 The purpose behind the stat-
ute's ninety percent rule was to prevent grain handlers from
speculating.35 The directors purposely speculated in grain com-
modities despite knowing the inherent risks involved in such a
venture. 8' By violating the statute, the directors acted in bad
faith and breached their duty to Queen City. 59 The business
judgment rule does not protect a director who acts in bad faith
by engaging in transactions that violate a statute. 60
349. See id. at 44.
350. See id. at 43.
351. 593 N.E.2d 328 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
352. See id. at 330.
353. See id. at 332.
354. See id. at 331.
355. See id.
356. See id. at 332.
357. See id.
358. See id.
359. See id.
360. See id.
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f. The Business Judgment Rule Applied to Derivatives
Lawsuits
The business judgment rule has not been directly applied in a
case involving losses from derivatives use. Likewise, courts have
not answered the question of how shareholders might shift their
burden of proof back to directors by demonstrating a breach of
duty for losing money in derivatives. Analogous cases involving
similar issues,3 61 as well as cases that have been settled, 62 pro-
vide some answers. According to a number of commentators,
shareholders are alleging a breach of the duty of care in order to
overcome the business judgment rule in cases involving deriva-
tives losses.3" Specifically, shareholders allege that directors
failed to discover all the information reasonably available to
them "regarding the advisability of derivatives as a concept" and
whether other alternatives were less risky.3 6
i. Recent Cases Against Directors for Derivatives Losses
In a recent suit filed against Rockefeller Center Properties,
Inc., shareholders alleged that directors entered into imprudent
and wasteful derivatives transactions which brought the compa-
ny close to bankruptcy.365 Similarly, misrepresentations and
361. See, e.g., Hoye v. Meek, 795 F.2d 893 (1Oth Cir. 1986) (holding directors liable
for the actual losses incurred due to their negligent investing); Brane v. Roth, 590
N.E.2d 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (awarding damages equal to the loss suffered by the
corporation attributable to the directors' negligent failure to hedge grain futures);
Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981) (holding a director liable
for corporate funds misappropriated by corporate officers).
362. See e.g., In re Piper Funds, Inc. Institutional Gov't Income Portfolio Litig. (D.
Minn); Axler v. Wagner, No. 94-CV-3097 (E.D. Pa.).
363. See generally Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) (de-
scribing the fiduciary duty of directors as including a duty of care); Spiotto, supra
note 331, at 372 (stating that directors have a duty of care to make informed busi-
ness decisions).
364. Spiotto, supra note 331, at 373; see W & W Equip. Co. v. Mink, 568 N.E.2d
564, 575 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) ("A director cannot blindly take action and later avoid
the consequences by saying he was not aware of the effect of the action he took. A
director has some duty to become informed about the actions he is about to under-
take.").
365. See Charal Inv. Co. v. Rockefeller, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,979, at
93,761 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7, 1995). This suit was dismissed because the shareholders
had filed their lawsuit before a special litigation committee had decided on the va-
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omissions in public statements concerning a company's financial
results and accounting for derivatives contracts resulted in a
class action against the company. 6 Most cases recently resolved
or still pending involve shareholders of funds suing fund manag-
ers for misrepresentation and violation of investment objectives
by including derivatives within the fund's portfolio.367 Most com-
monly, the complaints allege violations of the antifraud provi-
sions of the securities law and the Investment Company Act, 8
as well as common law fraud, negligence, and breach of fiduciary
duty.
B. Corporate Liability for Failure to Use Derivatives and
Fiduciary Duty to Affirmatively Use Them
Although shareholders sue directors for derivatives losses,
many corporations suffer losses because directors have failed to
minimize risk exposure. This implies that corporate directors
have a duty to investigate the viability of using derivatives as a
proven risk-reducing tool, and shareholders have a cause of ac-
tion to enforce the duty.
In Levy v. Bessemer Trust Co.,369 a client of a financial man-
agement and investment advisory service sued the firm for neg-
ligence, gross negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of
fiduciary duty, breach of the duty to supervise, and fraud. °
Levy, the client, held most of his portfolio in one company's
stock with restrictions on his ability to sellY.3 1 He repeatedly
lidity of the shareholders' pre-suit demand letter. See id. at 93,763.
366. See Axler v. Wagner, No. 94-CV-3097 (E.D. Pa.). This case has been settled
out of court.
367. See, e.g., Spiotto, supra note 331, at 389; In re Piper Funds, Inc. Institutional
Gov't Income Portfolio Litig., 71 F.3d 298, 300 (8th Cir. 1995) (involving a class ac-
tion suit that alleged negligent misrepresentations, breach of fiduciary duty, and vio-
lations of the federal securities laws, which settled for $70 million); Smith v. Citron,
(C.D. Cal.) (consisting of a class action that alleged the defendants recklessly gam-
bled with public money by investing in high risk, volatile derivatives which were ex-
cessively leveraged and not adequately hedged against loss).
368. 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-15(c) (1994) (creating specific duties for fund directors, in-
cluding the duty to examine all the information necessary to evaluate the terms of
investment advisory contracts and make other decisions vested in them by the Act).
369. No. 97 Civ. 1785 (JFK), 1997 WL 431079, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1997).
370. See id.
371. See id.
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asked Bessemer Trust Company (BTC), his brokerage firm, to
protect his investment from downward movement in the stock
price.y 2 BTC replied that due to the restrictions on his owner-
ship, there was no "immediate protection from downward price
movement."37 A broker at another firm informed Levy some six
months after hiring BTC, that indeed there was protection from
downward price movement.371 The competing dealer recommend-
ed a "European options collar", a combination put and call
option. 5 If BTC had entered into this type of transaction for
Levy six months earlier, his stock price would have a floor of
$33.33 per share and a ceiling of $44 per share.3 76 By the time
Levy had fired BTC and hired another broker to enter the
transaction, however, his price floor was $24.75 per share and
capped at $31.90 per share.377
The district court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss,
allowing the claims to go forward as sufficient to state a cause of
action.3 7' Levy alleged inter alia that BTC failed to know and
advise him of the availability of downside price protection; was
unaware of an investment protective strategy available and did
not find out about such a strategy despite his repeated inquiries;
made misrepresentations about its expertise in asset manage-
ment and investment advise; breached its fiduciary duty as in-
vestment advisor by giving erroneous information and thereby
induced him to maintain his account with BTC and forego other
advice; and that BTC knowingly made false statements about its
services and expertise in order to induce Levy to retain its ser-
vices.379
In Brane v. Roth,38 ° directors of a rural grain elevator coopera-
tive (co-op) failed to adequately hedge in the grain market and
were sued by shareholders for the losses. 8 ' The co-op's gross
372. See id.
373. Id.
374. See id.
375. See id.
376. See id.
377. See id. at *1-2.
378. See id. at *6.
379. See id. at *3-*5.
380. 590 N.E.2d 587 (Ind. App. 1992).
381. See id. at 589.
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profit had fallen continuously for four years.8 2 After a substan-
tial loss in the third year, the co-op accountant recommended
hedging in the grain market to minimize future losses.8 3
Directors gave authority to hedge to an inexperienced manag-
er. Only $20,050 of the co-op's $7,300,000 in grain sales were
hedged. The court found probative evidence that the co-op's loss-
es were due to a failure to hedge. M The court ruled that the
directors breached their duties by: (1) retaining a manager inex-
perienced in hedging; (2) failing to maintain reasonable supervi-
sion over him; (3) failing to have knowledge of hedging funda-
mentals, and the ability to direct hedging activities; and (4) act-
ing in a grossly inattentive manner. The court found that failing
to minimize risk to grain profits caused the loss of $424,038.89.85
Plaintiffs overcame the business judgment rule by showing
that the directors failed to inform themselves of all material
information available. This case implies that directors have a
duty to hedge against business risk if it could thereby be re-
duced. Additionally, a director's duty of care dictates that it have
sufficient knowledge of hedging strategy and that it consider all
alternatives reasonably available. In the context of derivatives,
directors would have a duty to consider derivatives as alterna-
tive hedging tools if hedging would reduce business risks. In
conjunction with the logic of Paramount Communications..6 and
Van Gorkom,87 if derivatives prove to be the most beneficial tool
available to hedge risk, directors have a duty to use them.
Shareholders suing on this theory must overcome the business
judgment rule. Three ways to overcome the rule were presented
above: proving (1) breach of the duty of care; (2) breach of the
duty of loyalty; or (3) failure to act in good faith. These tactics
are equally applicable to plaintiffs suing for failing to use deriv-
atives; however, a fourth method exists to overcome the rule
where inaction, rather than imprudent action, is the complaint.
The business judgment rule provides no protection to directors
382. See id.
383. See id.
384. See id.
385. See id. at 592.
386. See supra note 346.
387. See supra notes 335, 341-46 and accompanying text.
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who have adequate information indicating a course of action, but
fail to act absent a conscious decision not to act.388 According to
the Delaware Supreme Court, this is neglect, and as such should
be judged by a negligence standard rather than gross negli-
gence. 89 With a lower standard for a plaintiff, the business judg-
ment rule is no longer an insurmountable obstacle in these types
of cases. 9 '
C. Measuring Shareholder Losses Caused by Not Using
Derivatives
Asset-pricing models can be used to quantify the loss that a
firm's shareholders suffer when the firm does not use deriva-
tives. This section discusses the two major asset-pricing models:
the Capital-Asset Pricing Model and Arbitrage Pricing Theory. It
shows how an ex post variant of Arbitrage Pricing Theory can be
used to quantify the risk that shareholders face when a firm
does not use derivatives,3 91 and it provides an example of how
using derivatives could have greatly reduced the foreign-curren-
cy risk that shareholders of one firm faced.
1. The Capital-Asset Pricing Model
The Capital Asset-Pricing Model (CAPM) is a capital market
theory that provides that, in equilibrium, a security will have an
expected return that is a positive linear function of its
covariance with the market portfolio. 92 A security's total risk
388. See Spiotto, supra note 331, at 373.
389. See Rabkin v. Phillip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 547 A.2d 963, 972 (Del. Ch.
1986).
390. See id.; Spiotto, supra note 331. However, other "commentators have concluded
that a gross negligence standard may be appropriate." Id. at 374.
391. For more on the distinction between ex ante and ex post asset pricing models,
see Edward S. Adams & David E. Runkle, Solving a Profound Flaw in Fraud-on-the-
Market Theory: Utilizing a Derivative of Arbitrage Pricing Theory to Measure Rule
10b-5 Damages, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1097 (1997).
392. "Market portfolio" as used here is a term of art. The market portfolio in the
context of the CAPM specifically refers to:
A portfolio containing all marketable assets in proportions x*, where x =
total value of assets: total value of all assets in the market. The reason
all marketable assets must be in [the market portfolio] is simply that if
an asset were not in [the market portfolio], no investor would own it and
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can be divided into unsystematic risk, that portion unique to the
company that can be diversified away, and systematic risk, the
nondiversifiable portion that is related to the movement of the
stock market and is therefore unavoidable. 3 The CAPM is char-
acterized by the descriptive equation, ri = rf Pi(rm - rf), where r, is
the expected return on security i for the period, rm is the ex-
pected return on the market portfolio for the period, rf is the
return on a risk-free security3 94 for the period, and Pi is the sen-
sitivity or risk coefficient of security i relative to the market
portfolio-that is, Pi is a measure of security i's systematic risk.
The CAPM indicates that investors do not receive unsystematic
risk compensation in equilibrium; they receive only the risk-free
rate and a risk premium proportional to a security's level of
systematic risk. In sum, the CAPM signifies that, given market
conditions expressed in r. and rf, the expected return on a secu-
rity is a linear function of the security's systematic risk. The
greater the risk, the greater the expected return.
Because a well-diversified portfolio can eliminate company-
specific risk, investors are not compensated for bearing unsys-
tematic risk. Furthermore, because properly diversified investors
are exposed only to systematic risk, with the CAPM, the rele-
vant risk in the trade-off between the financial market's risk
and expected return is systematic rather than total risk. There-
fore "an investor is rewarded with higher expected returns for
bearing only market-related risk."
3 95
"Beta is the standard measure of risk in the CAPM. It [mea-
sures] the tendency of the return of a security to move in paral-
lel with the return of the stock market as a whole."396 Thus, beta
can be thought of as a measure of a security's volatility relative
to the market's volatility. "In [the] CAPM, the risk premium is
thus markets would not clear.
GORDON J. ALEXANDER & JACK CLARK FRANCIS, PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS 109 (Ezra Solo-
mon ed., 3d ed. 1986).
393. See David W. Mullins, Jr., Does the Capital Asset Pricing Model Work?, HARV.
Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 107.
394. As used herein, risk-free means that the nominal return for the period is
known with certainty. The term does not consider risks to the purchasing power of
the principal from inflation.
395. Mullins, supra note 393, at 107.
396. Id. at 108.
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measured as beta [multiplied by] the expected return on the
market less the risk-free rate. The risk premium of a security is
a fumction of the risk premium on the market, Rm -Rf, and var-
ies directly with... beta."39 '
If the CAPM describes market behavior correctly, the relevant
gauge of a security's risk is its market-related, or systematic,
risk measured by beta. "If a security's return bears a strong
positive relationship with the return on the market and thus has
a high beta, it will be priced to yield a high expected return. 8
Conversely, if a security has a low beta, it will be priced to yield
a low expected return.99
2. The Arbitrage-Pricing Theory Model
Somewhat problematically, the CAPM assumes that only one
factor, the market excess return, explains the undiversifiable
return to any security. However, there are good reasons to be-
lieve that other factors can explain stock returns. For example,
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, rising interest rates caused
the market value of the mortgages owned by savings and loan
associations to fall much more rapidly than the market value of
their liabilities."' In this case, the CAPM could not explain the
returns to publicly traded stocks of savings and loans as well as
an asset-pricing model that included both the market excess
return and bond returns.40 1
Arbitrage-Pricing Theory (APT), like the CAPM, is a theory of
asset pricing that describes the cross-section of returns of assets
in equilibrium as a linear function of systematic risk. However,
unlike the CAPM, which explains the cross-section of returns as
a function of the "covariance between asset returns and an en-
dogenous preference-based aggregate,"40 2 APT explains the cross-
397. Id. The assumption of proper diversification has eliminated the need for a
measure of unsystematic risk in the risk premium. See id.
398. Id.
399. See id. Financial markets price securities according to systematic risk. See id.
400. See Mark J. Flannery & Christopher M. James, The Effect of Interest Rate
Changes on the Common Stock Returns of Financial Institutions, 39 J. FIN. 1141,
1148-52 (1984).
401. See id.
402. Jay Shanken, Multi-Beta CAPM or Equilibrium-APT?: A Reply, 40 J. FIN.
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section of returns as a function of the "covariance between asset
returns and factors in the return generating process."4 3 APT
holds that "the expected return on any asset is directly related
to that asset's sensitivity to unanticipated movements in major
economic factors."40 4
In both the APT and the CAPM, it is assumed that unsystem-
atic risk can be eliminated by proper diversification. The APT
further assumes that competitive forces in the market quickly,
and without bias, eliminate arbitrage profit opportunities. The
absence of arbitrage opportunities means that "investor[s] can-
not earn a positive expected rate of return on any combination of
assets ... without making some net investment."' 5 The absence
of arbitrage profits follows from the APT's assumption that in-
vestors prefer more return to less for a given level of risk and
prefer less risk to more for a given level of return. Investors
acting in accordance with this assumption therefore will change
their portfolio asset composition by assuming both long and
short positions when given an opportunity to increase return
without increasing risk or decrease risk without decreasing re-
turn. In summary, the APT assumes a world in which "the rela-
tionship between return and risk will be determined by self-
interested investors who will exploit opportunities to build port-
folios of short and long positions, while making zero investment
[as the proceeds from the short positions finance the long posi-
tions] but certain, positive returns."406
The APT return-generating process is characterized by the
following linear K-factor model:
Rit = Ei Y-bih 8kt -it, [1]
k=1
1189, 1189 (1985).
403. Id.
404. Richard Roll & Stephen A. Ross, The Arbitrage Pricing Theory Approach to
Strategic Portfolio Planning, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May-June 1984, at 14, 18.
405. Michael A. Berry et al., Sorting Out Risks Using Known APT Factors, FIN.
ANALYSTS J., Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 29-30.
406. Dorothy H. Bower et al., Artibrage Pricing Theory and Utility Stock Returns,
39 J. FIN. 1041, 1043 (1984).
[Vol. 41:595650
THE EASY CASE FOR DERIVATIVES USE
where:
Rit is the return on asset i between dates t-1 and t, Bi is the
asset's expected return, 8k is the realization of the kth com-
mon factor (normalized to have a zero population mean), b is
the sensitivity of the return of asset i to the kth common
factor (called the factor loading), and Eit is the... [unsys-
tematic] return on the ith asset, which is assumed to have
zero mean and finite variance, and to be sufficiently indepen-
dent across securities so that... [unsystematic] risk can be
eliminated in large well-diversified portfolios. 40 7
The APT further assumes that investors "agree on both the
factor coefficients, [bik] and the expected returns, Ei."408 The re-
turn-generating process described by equation [1] states that the
return to an asset is equal to the asset's expected return (Ei)409
plus the asset's unanticipated return (bik k)41 plus the asset's
unsystematic risk return-_it).411
The developer of the APT, Stephen A. Ross, 412 as well as oth-
ers, demonstrated that:
absence of riskless arbitrage opportunities implies that ex-
pected returns [E] must satisfy (approximately):
E, = 1. b, 12.1 ..- bXk, [21
as the number of assets satisfying the factor model [1] tends
toward infinity where Xo is the intercept of the pricing rela-
tion and k. is the risk premium on the kth common factor,k = 1, . . K413
407. Bruce N. Lehmann & David M. Modest, The Empirical Basis of the Arbitrage
Pricing Theory, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 213, 215 (1988).
408. Richard Roll & Stephen A. Ross, An Empirical Investigation of the Arbitrage
Pricing Theory, 35 J. FIN. 1073, 1082 (1980).
409. The sum of the asset's returns to anticipated changes in the systematic risk
factors.
410. The sum of the asset's return to unanticipated changes in the systematic risk
factors.
411. The return to the asset's unsystematic risk, a return that is assumed to have
a mean of zero.
412. Ross developed APT in The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing, 13 J.
ECON. THEORY 341 (1976).
413. Lehmann & Modest, supra note 407, at 215.
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Roll points out that in equation [2]:
If there is a riskless asset with return, Eo, then bo, = 0 and
Eo = X.,
hence [equation 2 may be expressed as follows]
Ej - E. = X)bi .. .kbi,
with the understanding that Eo is the riskless rate of return
if such an asset exists, and is the common return on all
"zero-beta" assets, i.e., assets with blj = 0, for all j, whether or
not a riskless asset exists....
The pricing relationship [Ei = Xo 2%lbil ... Ak'bil] is the
central conclusion of the APT... , but it is natural to ask
what interpretation can be given to the 21k] factor risk pre-
mia. By forming portfolios with unit systematic risk on each
factor and no risk on other factors, each V/k] can be inter-
preted as [k] = Elk] - Eo, the excess return or market risk
premium on portfolios with only systematic factor k risk.
Then [Ei = Xo Xlbil . .. Xk'bil], can be rewritten as,
Ei - Eo = (El - EO)bil ... (Ek - EO)bik.414
The assumptions of the APT, like those of the CAPM, tend to
differ as the theoretical derivation of the model under investiga-
tion tends to vary from the original proponent's explication. As a
general matter, it is acknowledged that the assumptions of the
APT are less restrictive than those of the CAPM. In addition to
the assumptions detailed above, the following assumptions, or a
subset of the following assumptions, are common to theoretical
derivations of the APT:
1. Each asset has small idiosyncratic [unsystematic] vari-
ance, i.e., var (Ei) is small.
2. Each asset has small supply in the economy (at least in
414. Roll & Ross, supra note 408, at 1078-79.
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the limit).
3. There is a portfolio which, up to a constant, mimics
factorj (at least approximately, perhaps in the limit).
4. Some agent holds a well-diversified portfolio that does
not contain any idiosyncratic risk.
5. There is no arbitrage (directly or in some asymptotic
sense).
6. There is Pareto efficiency and/or aggregation....
8. All assets are in positive supply.
415
3. Using Arbitrage-Pricing Theory to Determine Hedging
Strategies
The APT can be used to determine empirically both risks the
shareholders of a firm face and derivative strategies that can be
used to reduce those risks. For example, if the APT showed that
a firm's stock price was sensitive to bond returns or changes in
foreign-exchange rates, the APT can also show how hedging can
reduce that risk. Suppose, for instance, that both overall stock
returns and the returns to ten-year bonds affected the stock
price of a particular bank. Furthermore, assume that linear
regression analysis showed that this relation took the following
form:
ri = a Pi(rm - r 7rb
where ri is the return for the bank's stock, rm is market return,
rf is the risk-free rate, and rb is the return on ten-year bonds.
Suppose further, that the regression estimates showed that the
relation was:
ri = 1.4(rm - rf) 0.5 rb
This equation shows that for every 1% increase in the value of
the stock market, the value of the bank's stock would rise by
1.4%, on average, with all other factors held constant. A one-
415. Philip H. Dybvig & Stephen A. Ross, Yes, the APT Is Testable, 40 J. FIN.
1173, 1175 (1985).
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percent increase in the value of the ten-year bond would be asso-
ciated with a half-percent increase in the value of the bank's
stock.
This regression shows that the bank's shareholders are faced
with interest-rate risk. Certainly, the bank should inform its
shareholders of that risk. It could also reduce that risk by hedg-
ing. One way the bank could hedge would be to take a short
position in ten-year bonds-that is, it could hedge by selling
bonds.416 If the bank wanted to eliminate completely its share-
holder's interest-rate risk by selling ten-year bonds, it would
short bonds with a market value of 0.5 times the market value
of the firm's stock. Every one percent decrease in the value of
the ten-year bond would be associated with a one-half percent
decrease in the value of the firm's stock. However, every one-
percent decrease in the value of the ten-year bond would cause a
one-half percent increase in the value of the bank's short posi-
tion in ten-year bonds, offsetting the market loss caused by the
unhedged interest-rate sensitivity.417
Thus, using regression analysis and the APT can help deter-
mine the risks that a firm's shareholders face and suggest how
hedging can be used to reduce those risks.
4. An Example of How Failing to Use Derivatives Increased
Shareholder Risk
Micron Electronics, Inc. is the third-largest direct seller of per-
sonal computers.418 In recent years, Micron's stock price has
fluctuated greatly, as have the stocks of many computer manu-
facturers and semiconductor firms. Between July 1997 and Jan-
uary 1998, the value of Micron's shares fell by over fifty percent,
causing a loss in market value of over $900 million.419
416. There are many ways that the bank could hedge using derivatives, including
using interest-rate options, swaps, futures, or forwards. The bank could also sell
fixed-rate loans or issue long-term fixed-rate liabilities.
417. Hedges with derivatives may actually be easier in this case, but this example
is the simplest way to understand how the hedge works.
418. See Digest, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1999, at El, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Major Newspapers File.
419. See 55 Value Line Investment Survey: Ratings & ReporL 1099 (Oct. 22, 1999).
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The collapse in Micron's stock price happened at the same
time as the turmoil in Asian currency markets, suggesting that
there might be a relationship between returns to Asian curren-
cies and the price of Micron's stock. In fact, there is such a rela-
tionship. Between the beginning of 1996 and March 1998, the
relation between the weekly stock returns for Micron, the re-
turns to the Wilshire 5000 index, and the dollar-dominated re-
turns to the Malaysian ringgit were:420
ri = 1.53(rm - 17) 0.61 rr
(0.45)(0.28)
where ri is the return for the Micron's stock, rm is the return on
the Wilshire 5000, rf is the risk-free rate, and rr is the return on
the Malaysian ringgit. The numbers in parentheses are the
standard errors for the regression coefficients. Both coefficients
are significantly different from zero at the five percent level.
This regression suggests that Micron shareholders were sub-
ject to substantial foreign-currency risk during this period. Ev-
ery percentage point decrease in the value of the ringgit was
associated with a 0.61% decline in the value of Micron's stock,
even after taking into account the relation between movements
in Micron's stock price and the Wilshire 5000 index.
Micron shareholders probably were not aware that they faced
such substantial foreign currency risk. Micron could have in-
formed them of that specific risk. It failed to do so in any public
disclosures made to shareholders. Micron also could have hedged
this risk by selling ringgit forward contracts. It failed to do that
as well.
Suppose that Micron had sold six-month ringgit forward con-
tracts in July 1997. Then in January 1998, Micron would have
gained on its ringgit forward contracts if the value of the ringgit
420. The Wilshire 5000 is one of the broadest stock-market indices available for the
United States. See KENNETH M. MORRIS & ALAN M. SIEGEL, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING MONEY & INVESTING 68 (1993). Thus, it may
capture overall stock-price movements better than more narrowly targeted indices.
The ringgit was chosen for this illustrative example because there is a market in
ringgit forward contracts. The constant is omitted from the regression because its
estimated value was zero.
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had dropped to a lower value that Micron agreed to in the for-
ward contracts. If Micron had fully hedged its ringgit risk in
July, then by January it would have gained over $400 million on
those contracts, which would have reduced Micron shareholders'
losses by almost forty-five percent.421
Thus, it appears that more than $400 million in Micron share-
holder's losses could have been avoided by proper use of deriva-
tives. In this case, not using derivatives exposed shareholders to
greater risk than was appropriate, we contend, given the steps
Micron could have easily taken to mitigate such risk-a breach
of its fiduciary duty to its shareholders.422
IV. How CAN DERIVATIVES BE USED SAFELY?
In light of the previous examples, it is clear that a proper
approach to derivatives use is needed. Several private sector risk
management initiatives have evolved that propose recommenda-
tions for safe and effective derivatives use. The most widely
recognized and influential is the 1993 report of the Group of
Thirty entitled Derivatives: Practices and Principles,' and a
follow-up survey in 1995 on industry practice.4' This study was
conducted by representatives of dealers, end-users, academics,
accountants, and lawyers involved with derivatives and has been
endorsed by international regulators.425 It presents twenty rec-
ommendations directed at the OTC derivatives market, but that
are also beneficial for corporations. Although these recommenda-
421. Micron's value in July was approximately $1.9 billion. See 55 Value Line In-
vestment Survey: Ratings & Reports 1099 (Oct. 22, 1999). If one assumes a 35%
gain in the short position of futures contracts between July and January, Micron
could have fully hedged by taking a short ringgit position of 0.61 dollars worth of
ringgits for every dollar in Micron's market value. The resulting gain on the short
position would have been 0.61 x 0.35 x $1.9 billion = $413 million.
422. It might have been easier for individual shareholders to have hedged them-
selves against the foreign currency risk if they had been aware of it than for Micron
to have taken such a large ringgit position itself.
423. See GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 40.
424. See Joanne T. Medero, Managing Risk of Derivatives-Recent Developments Af-
fecting Dealers and End-Users, in 27TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 1995, at 409 (PLI Corp. L. and Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B-907,
1995).
425. See Joanne T. Medero, Swaps and Other Derivatives: Regulatory and Legisla-
tive Developments, 10 S&P's REV. OF BANKING & FIN. SERVS. 117, 117 (1994).
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tions are "without the force of law," many market participants
have adopted or incorporated them into their own internal pol-
icies and procedures. 426 The common thread running through all
of the recently proposed initiatives is the emphasis on manage-
ment controls. This is not unusual considering that the lack of
management controls was a contributing factor in each of the
derivatives case studies presented above. According to Leslie
Rahl, a principal in Capital Market Risk Advisors Inc., a finan-
cial consulting firm in New York, "'[i]t's not derivatives causing
the problem, but a lack of management controls, and process." 27
A. EPIC Management Control System
This Article embraces the Group of Thirty recommendations
and proposes a four step process for sound, effective derivative
use: the EPIC management control system. The four steps are:
education, policy, implementation, and control.
1. Education
EPIC's first step is complete corporate education with respect
to derivatives and risk exposure. Consequently, senior manage-
ment must take all necessary steps to ensure that those in the
institution responsible for carrying out the policies regarding
derivatives be educated properly.428 According to Brandon
Becker, Director of the Market Regulation Division of the SEC,
the best protection in an OTC derivatives transaction is an "in-
formed investor."429 An informed investor must understand both
how and when to use derivatives and understand the firm's
risks. Understanding how and when to use derivatives includes
426. See generally Hearings, supra note 203, at 167 (statement of Richard B. Rob-
erts, Executive Vice President and Treasurer, Wachovia Corp.).
427. Bencivenga, supra note 63, at 5.
428. See Roger D. Blanc, Developing Internal Controls to Manage Derivatives, IN-
SIGHTS, Apr. 1995, at 9.
429. Fields Says No Immediate Need for OTC Derivatives Legislation, Banking Rp.
(BNA), (Feb. 27, 1995); see Nusbaum, supra note 246, at 62. Woody Teel, the execu-
tive vice president at Bank of America who heads Bank of America's trading expo-
sure, control and compliance department, considers "a knowledgeable board of direc-
tors" the first of six recommendations "for an effective risk management structure."
Id. at 62-63.
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knowing the types of derivatives that are available, how each
functions within a particular investment strategy and the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of each. Understanding the firm's
risks encompasses "identify[ing] the full scope of risks [to which]
the business is exposed" and understanding the variables that
effect those exposures.430 In addition, it is important to know the
firm's tolerance for loss. In other words, determining how much
loss the firm can shoulder realistically.
2. Policy
The second step of the EPIC management control system in-
volves setting the corporate derivatives policy. A policy concern-
ing derivatives should be instituted with the active participation
of the board of directors and senior management 43' and should
consist of a statement explaining the purpose for the use of de-
rivatives. It should also include the extent to which derivatives
will be used in pursuit of the overall business objectives 4 2 and a
clear and concise risk management policy. The risk management
policy should establish specific and consistent risk management
expectations by setting limits to market and credit risk expo-
sure433 as well as guidelines to minimize legal4' and liquidity
risk.43
5
These policies should be communicated in unambiguous terms
and distributed in writing to senior management and all those in-
volved in any of the phases of the EPIC management control sys-
tem. Without the completion of the educational phase, however,
the objectives and directives of the corporate derivatives policy
430. Using Derivatives, supra note 200, at 34.
431. See generally id. passim (providing eight experts' comments regarding the im-
portance of derivative knowledge by every top-level manager).
432. See Blanc, supra note 428, at 9; Derivatives Reconsidered, supra note 56, at
*3.
433. See Using Derivatives, supra note 200, at 34.
434. See infra notes 478-90 and accompanying text.
435. The EPIC management system as a whole is designed to minimize operational
risk. Systemic or liquidity risk is largely beyond the control of a single entity. Es-
sentially it requires the cooperation of large portions of the market in order to min-
imize these risks. A few recommendations of activities a single entity can take to
help reduce liquidity risk are mentioned later in this section, but a complete discus-
sion of this type of risk management is beyond the scope of this Article.
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will be meaningless because of the diverse levels of understand-
ing regarding derivatives, risks and investment strategies.
3. Implementation
The third step of the EPIC management control system is the
implementation of "a comprehensive derivatives [investment]
strategy designed to clarify the specific circumstances under
which [the corporation] will use derivatives." 6 The purpose of
this strategy is to aid a corporation in meeting the goals estab-
lished in the derivatives policy. The implementation of the in-
vestment strategy should always involve the active participation
of the board of directors and senior management and be consis-
tent with the board's authorization." The goals and resources
will vary from firm to firm and there is no boilerplate strategy
that will be effective for all firms; however, several recommenda-
tions apply almost universally. First, derivative use should cor-
respond in quantity, complexity, and risk with the objectives of
the corporation.43 Second, unnecessary risk should be avoided in
the areas of speculation and leveraging. 9 Consequently, deriva-
tives should be used almost exclusively for hedging. Hedging
strategies should involve views on market direction. Investors
should not use derivatives to increase expected short term prof-
its, but rather to adjust exposures to risk.' ° The general rule
should be to use derivatives as a means of shifting risk and not
as a means of trading in risk."1 If a corporation decides to avoid
risk by employing derivatives exclusively as a hedging instru-
ment, it is advisable to express this intention clearly to all indi-
viduals involved in the trading of derivatives and to set clear
436. Derivatives Reconsidered, supra note 56, at *3.
437. See id. According to the Economist Intelligence Report, most companies are
currently employing derivatives with senior management involvement and approval.
See id.
438. See Using Derivatives, supra note 200, at 34. Barings and Gibson are prime
examples of inappropriate quantity. Gibson is a textbook example of inappropriate
complexity. Orange County and Barings are examples of inappropriate risk.
439. See id.
440. See id. at 37; Derivatives Reconsidered, supra note 56, at *3.
441. See Using Derivatives, supra note 200, at 37.
20001 659
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
and unambiguous guidelines to reinforce those expectations. 2
Because leveraging magnifies the risk of a transaction, it should
be avoided in most cases. The third recommendation is to avoid
the use of derivatives that are extremely complex.' Most hedg-
ing can be accomplished with fairly straightforward derivatives.
Fourth, any personnel authorized to engage in derivatives trans-
actions must be well-qualified, appropriately trained, and in-
formed of the firm's investment strategy and tolerance for loss.
Fifth, senior management should indicate clearly "the lines of
decision-making authority" for the investment of derivatives."
Sixth and finally, a timely derivatives activities report should be
given to senior management so as to keep them informed of the
current derivatives investment status."5
4. Control
The final step in the EPIC management control system is the
control phase. Here, the investor must establish and maintain a
key set of internal controls to ensure that all of the derivatives
transactions taking place are authorized and in accord with the
policies and strategies that have been enacted, and that any
deviations from these standards are reported."' This control
mechanism is accomplished by the use of a valuation procedure
that incorporates all of the relevant risk factors and produces a
model of possible outcomes that are compared with actual per-
formance.447 All of the analyzed risk exposures should be quanti-
fied using ranges and relative probabilities because no single
value method currently exists." 8 It is critical to the effectiveness
442. See id.
443. Always remember Gibson Greetings. See generally Craig & Hume, supra note
4 (discussing the plight of Gibson Greetings).
444. Using Derivatives, supra note 200, at 36.
445. See id.
446. See Adams & Runkle, supra note 391, at 21-22, 24-25; Blanc, supra note 428,
at 9. The Group of Thirty recommendations have been very influential in this phase
of the EPIC management control system. See Derivatives Reconsidered, supra note
56, at *3; Using Derivatives, supra note 200, at 36.
447. See Nusbaum, supra note 246, at 63 (presenting six recommendations made by
Woody Teel, the Executive Vice President of Bank of America).
448. See supra notes 391-417 and accompanying text (discussing risk measurement
mechanisms); see also Using Derivatives, supra note 200, at 34. Well-reasoned
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of the overall control mechanism that all derivatives positions
and risk exposures are monitored frequently and regularly by
well-qualified and knowledgeable people." 9 A system of checks
and balances is also recommended for the collection and dis-
bursement of derivatives transactions information in order to
prevent a repeat of the Barings Bank disaster, and as a means
of analyzing the data received from those with varying levels of
derivatives experience and risk tolerance.45° A recent GAO re-
port45' recommended that two separate groups, one of traders
with customer contact and one of administrative staff with ac-
counting and operations responsibility, provide a desirable check
on each other as long as each is independent of unwanted influ-
ences and each other.452 For example, a risk manager should not
report to anybody whose compensation depends on revenues
from trading or receive bonuses based on the revenue perfor-
mance of the traders they monitor.
4 3
B. Managing Risk
To understand how this type of control mechanism helps to
manage risk, it is helpful to understand how each of the five
primary types of risk associated with all investments is mini-
mized by the use of this process. The principal risks associated
with derivatives include: market risk, credit risk, legal risk,
liquidity or systemic risk, and operational risk.
1. Market Risk
Market risk is the exposure to the possibility of financial loss
caused by adverse changes in the values of assets or liabilities.M
This risk exists in all investments. Managing market risk can be
quantification involving ranges and probability, although admittedly imperfect, can be
a powerful tool in reducing risk exposure. Id.
449. See Nusbaum, supra note 246, at 62-63; see also Adams & Runkle, supra note
391, at 24-25.
450. See Using Derivatives, supra note 200, at 36.
451. See GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 24.
452. See Nusbaum, supra note 248, at 63.
453. See id.
454. See GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 60.
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very complex.455 It requires measuring market risk, which in
turn is dependent upon an accurate valuation of the instru-
ment.45 This can be difficult because many factors affect deriva-
tives' values. "Accurately measuring the market risk for deriva-
tives portfolios requires the use of modern computer systems
and software that rely on the most advanced mathematical,
statistical, and database techniques."457 Once a computer valua-
tion model is created, mark to market4 58 the derivatives portfo-
lios on a regular basis, preferably at least once a day.459 This
will produce a measure of the derivatives' current values that
can be used to gather information about market risk.46 °
Market risk can be calculated using the value-at-risk method-
ology. In spite of the described inaccuracies inherent in this
methodology, it is considered an accepted risk measurement
mechanism.4"' Once the amount predicted to be lost from an
adverse market movement is determined, this amount should be
compared to market risk limits that have been agreed upon by
senior management and the board of directors. This comparison
acts as a way to evaluate the current derivatives strategy. In
addition, it enables the investor to implement an appropriate
hedging strategy to minimize these excessive market risks. It is
important to note that an unanticipated positive performance is
just as dangerous as an unanticipated negative performance.4"'
Both results indicate that some aspect of the derivatives
strategy has not been understood properly.463 Although value-at-
risk is useful for monitoring daily market risk exposure, it does
455. See id.; see also Brandon Becker & Francois Mazur, Risk Management and In-
ternal Controls, in 27TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION, 1995, at 351
(PLI Corp. L. and Prac. Handbook Series B-907, 1995) (discussing the management
of specific types of risk).
456. See GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 60.
457. Id.
458. "Mark to market" refers to revaluing the investment instrument at the end of
the trading day based on prices established during the trading session.
459. Intraday or real time valuations provide even greater accuracy and assurance
in risk management calculations. See Becker & Mazur, supra note 455, at 369.
460. See id. at 369-70; Hearings, supra note 203 (statement of Richard B. Roberts,
Executive Vice President and Treasurer, Wachovia Corp.).
461. See Becker & Mazur, supra note 455, at 371.
462. See Using Derivatives, supra note 200, at 34.
463. See id.
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not provide an accurate representation of the maximum poten-
tial loss. In order to determine how unusually volatile events
will effect the market risk exposure and valuation of a portfolio,
stress tests should be conducted.4
2. Credit Risk
Credit risk is the risk that a counterparty will not have suffi-
cient resources to meet the obligations contained in the contract
and thus will default.465 "Managing... credit risk can be diffi-
cult because the extent of exposure can change rapidly." 6
"Credit risk [exposure can be minimized] and controlled by im-
plementing procedures to measure and monitor credit risk expo-
sure, executing... netting agreements 467 with counterparties,
and seeking collateral or other credit enhancements." 46' The first
step in managing credit risk is full and accurate measurement of
the credit risk associated with the derivatives. It is recommend-
ed that two individual credit risk measurements be computed:
one measuring the current level of credit risk exposure and the
second measuring the potential level of credit risk exposure.469
The current exposure measurement, as the name implies, mea-
sures the credit risk exposure level at a given point in time. The
potential exposure measurement is an estimate of the worst case
464. See Hearings, supra note 203, at 237 (statement of Richard B. Roberts, Execu-
tive Vice President and Treasurer, Wachovia Corp.); Becker & Mazur, supra note
455, at 372.
465. See Hearings, supra note 203, at 237 (statement of Richard B. Roberts, Execu-
tive Vice President and Treasurer, Wachovia Corp.).
466. GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 56.
467. A netting agreement is defined by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 as
a contract or agreement between [two] . . . financial institutions that . . .
is governed by the laws of the United States, any State, or any political
subdivision of any State, and... provides for netting present or future
payment obligations or payment entitlements (including liquidation or
close-out values relating to the obligations or entitlements) [between] the
parties to the agreement....
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
242, § 402(14), 105 Stat. 2236, 2373. This means that a netting agreement is en-
forceable, notwithstanding the insolvency of one of the parties.
468. Becker & Mazur, supra note 455, at 374.
469. See id.
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scenario over a certain time period. An investor should total all
of the credit risk to which it is regularly exposed because credit
risk can change rapidly. To minimize the impact of credit risk
exposure, it is important to establish limits on the amount of
exposure per each counterparty individually47 ° and to avoid con-
centrating derivatives transactions with a single counterparty.
471
Once credit risk limits are set for each counterparty, credit risk
exposures for each counterparty should be compared regularly to
the established limits. 472 As with market risk management, it is
critical that credit risk management be independent to ensure
objectivity.4 3 Investors can take at least two steps to reduce
both current and potential credit risk exposure. First, investors
are advised to enter into bilateral netting agreements to reduce
credit risk exposure.4' 4 A bilateral netting agreement is a con-
tract between counterparties in which the parties agree to be
bound by the obligations of the investment transactions even in
the face of insolvency. Second, investors are advised to consider
using credit enhancements, such as collateral, guarantees, and
letters of credit to reduce credit risk exposure.475
3. Legal Risk
There are two types of legal risk. One type of legal risk refers
to the possibility of financial loss resulting from an action by a
court, a regulatory entity, or a legislative body that invalidates a
financial contract.476 The second type of legal risk refers to the
possibility of financial loss when a party to a contract is deemed,
by law, to have lacked the authority to have entered into the
contract. 47 7 These types of risks can exist in any contract and are
not unique to derivative contracts.
470. See Using Derivatives, supra note 200, at 36. The determination of what to set
as a limit can be based on the credit rating of the counterparty. See id.
471. See Becker & Mazur, supra note 455, at 376.
472. See id.
473. See GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 56; Becker & Mazur, supra note 455, at
377.
474. See GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 57; Becker & Mazur, supra note 455, at
377. For a definition of a netting agreement, see supra note 467.
475. See Becker & Mazur, supra note 455, at 377.
476. See GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 64.
477. See id. at 65.
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The status of derivatives can be the cause of legal risk be-
cause most of the laws governing their use were enacted prior to
the use of many of today's derivatives.47 In addition, the numer-
ous configurations that a derivative instrument can take often
pose problems in determining which law applies to the transac-
tion. Legal risk resulting from the lack of authority of a
counterparty has occurred most commonly in the context of a
broker entering into an agreement with a government entity
that was not authorized to enter into the contract. In these cas-
es, the transaction often is found to be null and void.479 Unlike
market and credit risk, legal risk is not the type that can be
managed by setting limits to the extent of allowable exposure
and taking action to conform to those limits. Rather, legal risk is
minimized most effectively by adopting a best practices guide-
line. Best practices guidelines are developed by researching the
legal status of current derivatives and the authority of the
counterparty to enter into transactions.48 ° In addition, thorough
and concise policies and procedures should be established requir-
ing that all new derivatives transactions involve the legal deter-
mination of the status of the transaction and the authority of all
counterparties to enter into it.
4. Liquidity Risk
Liquidity risk is the possibility that a disruption in one mar-
ket will cause further disruption in other markets.4 ' The result
is a restricted ability to sell, dispose or close out a current posi-
tion, thus affecting its value.482 This risk is the same for all in-
vestments and is not unique to derivatives.
478. See Becker & Mazur, supra note 455, at 381. One example of a transaction
that faces formidable legal risks concerning enforceability in some jurisdictions is a
netting agreement when a counterparty has become bankrupt or insolvent. See id. at
388.
479. See Hazell v. Hammersmith & Fulham London Borough Council, 2 Q.B. 697
(Eng. C.A. 1990). The House of Lords ruled that the London Borough of
Hammersmith and Fulham was acting beyond its authority and the capacity of its
council when it entered into swap transactions. See id at 700.
480. See Becker & Mazur, supra note 455, at 390.
481. See Hearings, supra note 203, at 238 (statement of Richard B. Roberts, Execu-
tive Vice President and Treasurer, Wachovia Corp.).
482. See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 39-40 (discussing the impact of
liquidity problems in one market on all related markets).
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There are two types of liquidity risk. Market liquidity risk, or
systemic risk, is the risk that disruptions in the market or the
lack of available positions will prevent an investor from offset-
ting a current position with a competitively priced derivatives
transaction at the appropriate time.4 3 The second type is fund-
ing liquidity risk. It is the risk that mismatched durations of
inflowing and outflowing funds will lead to an investor's inabili-
ty to make payment obligations.4" There is nothing an investor
can do to eliminate market liquidity risk because it concerns the
continuing liquidity in both the underlying market and the de-
rivatives market, something that is beyond the control of any
one investor.485 The best that an investor can do to manage mar-
ket liquidity risk is to understand thoroughly both the deriva-
tives market and the market of the underlying asset.486 This can
be made easier by working with other market participants and
regulators,48 which will help the investor recognize what harbin-
gers exist to warn of ensuing liquidity difficulties, thus enabling
appropriate action to be taken prior to the inaccessibility of the
market. Management of funding liquidity risk is achieved most
effectively through the identification of mismatched payment
and delivery obligations and the implementation of models that
characterize the effects of market changes on these cash flows. 488
5. Operational Risk
Operational risk is the possibility of financial loss resulting
from inadequate systems, management failure, faulty controls,
deficient procedures, human error, or fraud.489 The EPIC man-
483. See Becker & Mazur, supra note 455, at 379.
484. See id.
485. See Angela Drolte, Fed Risk Guidelines for End-Users of Derivatives Due Soon,
Phillips Says, Banking Rep. (BNA), (Mar. 24, 1995). See generally GAO REPORT, su-
pra, note 32, at 36-42 (analyzing the concentration of derivatives dealer activity and
its effect on market liquidity).
486. See Becker & Mazur, supra note 455, at 380.
487. See Hearings, supra note 203, at 238 (statement of Richard B. Roberts, Execu-
tive Vice President and Treasurer, Wachovia Corp.).
488. See Becker & Mazur, supra note 455, at 380.
489. See Hearings, supra note 203, at 237 (statement of Richard B. Roberts, Execu-
tive Vice President and Treasurer, Wachovia Corp.); Becker & Mazur, supra note
455, at 390.
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agement control system, although protecting against many types
of risk exposure, is ultimately an operational risk minimizer.
The four most effective steps that can be taken by an investor to
reduce operational risk consist of the education of employees,
the establishment of clear investment policies, the implementa-
tion of investment strategies that achieve the objectives of the
company while following the set policies, and an independent
control system that continually monitors and reports derivatives
performance, risk *exposure, and the effectiveness of the invest-
ment strategies. These four steps to minimize operational risk
are also the four phases of the EPIC management control sys-
tem. In addition, each of these operational risk reducers are
embedded throughout the EPIC management control system.
According to the Economist Intelligence Unit's survey results,
the use of derivatives is widespread and growing.49 ° Although
this report also indicates that the majority of companies use
them responsibly and employ adequate risk management sys-
tems,491 such as the Group of Thirty's recommendations, it is
obvious that not everyone is using them properly. Orange Coun-
ty, Barings, and Gibson Greetings would have reduced the possi-
bility of experiencing their tremendous losses, if not prevented it
all together, if they would have employed a thorough risk man-
agement system like the one proposed here.
V. WHAT DOES AND SHOULD THE FUTURE
HOLD FOR DERIVATIVES?
Most experts agree that negative press coverage will not slow
the use of derivatives. One recent survey completed by more
than one hundred financial executives found that ninety-five
percent of respondents indicated a favorable attitude toward
derivatives.492 In fact, fifty-two percent regularly use them as
essential tools. 493 "'Despite the well-publicized blow-ups, few
companies are pulling their oars from the derivative water-
ways,'" said Bill Millar, editor of the Economist Intelligence
490. See Derivatives Reconsidered, supra note 56, at *1.
491. See id.
492. See id. at *2.
493. See id.
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Unit's finance division and author of the report.4" A survey pub-
lished by Institutional Investor found that only around three
percent of institutional investors and corporate treasurers who
used derivatives indicated that they expected to decrease their
use of derivatives in 1995.49' In fact, some experts predict that in
the coming decade nearly all funds will use derivatives to some
extent.496 One reason for these optimistic attitudes and positive
predictions is the recognition that derivatives are effective, low-
cost risk management tools that are becoming essential to corpo-
rations that do business in the diverse and often volatile global
marketplace.
In spite of the promising future, derivatives still bear some
stigma. In an interview with Fortune magazine, a representative
for Bankers Trust refused to reveal the names of some CEOs
who are trading in derivatives, responding, "'Nobody's going to
come out and say anything publicly, because they get skewered
by the press and everybody else. You know, 'so-and-so's in deriv-
atives." 497 The interviewer, Carl Loomis, said he experienced
this attitude first-hand when he conducted a company survey
recently. When he asked company representatives whether they
were trading in derivatives, many were evasive.498 "You would
have thought we'd asked about incest," he said.499
Three major questions remain for the future: whether addi-
tional regulation will be imposed on the use of derivatives;
whether litigation resulting from derivatives losses will increase
or decrease; and whether derivatives will tend toward
customization or standardization.
A. Regulation
Regulation and legislation are natural responses to recent
derivatives losses. A principal supporter of additional control in
the derivatives market has been the General Accounting Office
494. Id.
495. See Muehring, supra note 1, at 39.
496. See Frankel, supra note 159, at 330.
497. Loomis, supra note 4, at 68.
498. See id.
499. Id.
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(GAO). In a detailed, published report to Congress, the GAO
recommended greater accountability and possibly new regula-
tions to force market participants to act responsibly.5" Congress
has joined the cause by introducing several bills that would re-
quire derivatives to be regulated similarly to securities and com-
modities.5"'
Despite significant support for additional regulation of the
derivatives market, far more support exists to prevent further
regulation. The arguments against additional regulation fall
generally into two areas: (1) allow caveat emptor to guide invest-
ment; and (2) regulation imposes unnecessary costs on the mar-
ket.
The caveat emptor argument requires two preconditions: (1)
the current securities and commodities rules must sufficiently
regulate the derivatives market; 2 and (2) most of the deriva-
500. See Craig & Hume, supra note 4, at 117. The Report urged "Congress to bring
unregulated derivative affiliates of securities and insurance firms under federal regu-
lation by assigning this responsibility to the SEC." Id. Most of these reconmenda-
tions to regulators would not require legislation, and in fact regulators are already
exercising their authority in many of the suggested areas.
501. See, e.g., Financial Accounting Fairness Act of 1998, H.R. 3165, 105th Cong.;
Accurate Accounting Standards Certification Act of 1997, S. 1560, 105th Cong.; Com-
modity Exchange Amendments Act of 1997, S. 257, 105th Cong.; Derivative Safety
and Soundness Supervision Act of 1995, H.R. 31, 104th Cong.; Risk Management
Improvement and Derivative Oversight Act of 1995, H.R. 20, 104th Cong.; Craig &
Hume, supra note 4, at 169; see also Markey Introduces Derivatives Bill: SEC Would
Oversee Unregulated Dealers, supra note 279, at *1 (describing legislation introduced
by Rep. Edward Markey seeking to expand SEC jurisdiction to cover currently un-
regulated derivatives dealers). For a discussion in support of the regulation of swaps
dealers, see Hu, supra note 142, at 333.
502. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 159, at 304-05 ("[Mlisleading statements about
any investment by a broker or investment advisor are already punishable under
[common law and] the securities [and commodities] laws."). This leads to the argu-
ment that derivatives present no clear justification for additional regulation. See
Hearings, supra note 203, at 241 (statement of Richard B. Roberts, Executive Vice
President and Treasurer, Wachovia Corp.) (stating that the current regulatory en-
vironment and voluntary efforts by industry participants and sufficient for managing
current derivative activity). Richard B. Roberts told Congress that although deriva-
tives transactions are not without risk, federal regulators, industry experts, and the
ABA believe that the Senate should not pursue any restrictive actions that would
inhibit the ability of banks to enter into derivatives transactions. See id. at 236
(statement of Richard B. Roberts, Executive Vice President and Treasurer, Wachovia
Corp.) ("[Tihe ABA believes that its members are adequately managing the risks as-
sociated with the use of derivatives; that the Federal regulators are appropriately
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tives losses must be due to investor conduct (such as inadequate
internal controls or greed) rather than dealer conduct. Caveat
emptor places the burden on investors to inform themselves
about the uses of derivatives and to recognize the limits of their
understanding. The argument treats derivatives no differently
than other complicated investments. It applies most forcefully to
sophisticated fund managers who have access to advanced risk
management and market analysis models. It is not so persuasive
when applied to the lay investor. According to Alan Greenspan,
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, "[m]arkets function most effi-
ciently when both parties to financial transactions are free to
enter into transactions at their own discretion, unhampered by
any perceived need to serve the interests of their
counterparties." °3
Additional regulations may lead to additional costs for all
market participants. Richard Roberts told the Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs that any effort to restrict
engagement in derivatives transactions would increase "costs
and burdens to the industry and the communities served by
these institutions."5 Specifically, Roberts noted that additional
regulations would force financial intermediaries to take on more
interest rate risk, or force them to restrict the amount of credit
they make available to local communities." 5 In addition, many
dealers "could be denied the ability to acquire investment secu-
rities appropriate to that institution's investment philosophy."" 6
In his statement to the Committee, Greenspan warned that by
"singling out derivative instruments for special regulatory treat-
ment," investment transactions would be determined by the
"artificial incentives" that these regulations would produce rath-
supervising bank activity in this area; and that no other need exists for legislation.").
503. Hearings, supra note 203, at 53 (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System); see also Derivatives Debacle; Orange Coun-
ty Woes Unlikely to Spur U.S. Action, supra note 223, at *1 (reporting Acting Trea-
sury Secretary Frank N. Newman's comment that the administration sees no need
for major legislation on derivatives).
504. Hearings, supra note 203, at 236 (statement of Richard B. Roberts, Executive
Vice President and Treasurer, Wachovia Corp.).
505. See id.
506. Id.
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er than on the appropriateness of the investment instruments
themselves.'" Greenspan believes that this would lead to the
use of investment instruments less efficient than derivatives in
order to avoid new regulations.0 8 This would result in higher
costs to market participants and reduce market efficiency.50 9
Some commentators have pointed to the recent regulations im-
posed on heavily leveraged derivatives, requiring investors to
value them on a mark-to-market basis.510 Although most compa-
ies agree that this is a wise practice, many companies feel that
mark-to-market accounting is too costly to employ. It is predict-
ed that the use of these types of derivatives will likely be re-
duced due to this regulation."'
Greenspan has suggested more indirect control through inves-
tor education or assistance:
[Tihere may be cases in which certain customers can, in prin-
ciple, use complex instruments to reduce risk or enhance
yield, but, in practice, cannot reasonably be expected to un-
derstand the instruments and the risks sufficiently well to
achieve these objectives without assistance. For such custom-
ers, a way must be found to ensure that transactions are
used effectively for the purposes for which they are intend-
ed.'12
This in no way means more regulation. In fact, he specifically
warned that if investors shift risks back to dealers through legal
recourse enabled by more regulation, dealers will "likely...
507. Id. at 52-53 (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve System).
508. See id. at 53.
509. See id; see also Baker, supra note 209, at *1 (stating that substantial losses
could occur if restrictions on the use of derivatives force dealers to substitute more
expensive and less accurate strategies). Another way new regulation can be detri-
mental to the derivatives industry concerns proposed legislation to eliminate specula-
tion activity. This type of regulation would result in the reduction of liquidity in the
derivatives market and the innovation of new risk management instruments. In
addition it would force investors who need such devices, to move to riskier strate-
gies.
510. See Loomis, supra note 4, at 68.
511. See id.
512. Hearings, supra note 203, at 53 (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System).
20001 671
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
charge an additional premium to compensate them for the un-
certainties of future legal claims."51
Any attempt at regulation has been met with intense debate.
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) had continu-
ally postponed release of its controversial proposals, but after
ten years of debate and two years of construction, the FASB
formally issued a standard for derivatives and hedge accounting
in June 1998.514 The new standard mandates sweeping changes
in the way companies account for derivatives. As of June 15,
1999, companies must record the fair-market value of deriva-
tives, as assets or liabilities, on their balance sheets.515 When
derivatives do not zero out a loss or a gain on the instruments
they were to hedge, the company must account for the changes
in the derivatives' value in the earnings.516 The FASB has reject-
ed Greenspan's advice to maintain current "best practices" in
historical cost-based accounting while requiring large firms to
file supplemental disclosures based on fair value amounts.517
Currently, many derivative instruments are not carried on the
balance sheet and their effects on income are difficult to dis-
cern.518 The derivatives industry claims that the FASB stan-
dards could discourage the use of valuable hedging tools. 519
Bankers and derivatives dealers lobbied vigorously against the
rules, and Congress contemplated restricting FASB's power to
regulate derivatives, even though Congress originally pushed the
FASB to adopt standards for derivatives in response to the Or-
ange County disaster.5 20 There was, however, some support for
the standards, especially with the Asian currency crisis rippling
through the derivatives industry. It is important to note, how-
ever, that the FASB proposal does not address the risk of not
513. Id.
514. See Elizabeth MacDonald, FASB Approves Controversial Derivatives Rule, WALL
ST. J., June 2, 1998, at A3.
515. See id.
516. See id.
517. FASB Rejects Greenspan Advice Concerning Derivatives Proposal, 29 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1610 (Nov. 14, 1997).
518. See id.
519. See Paul Beckett, FASB Postpones Expected Proposals on Derivatives, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 18, 1997, at B1l.
520. See MacDonald, supra note 514, at A3.
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using derivatives. If a firm is subject to foreign currency risk or
commodity-price risk, the firm does not need to quantify its
exposure in its disclosures. Thus, shareholders may be lulled
into complacency by believing that a firm that does not use de-
rivatives is safer than one that does. However, as our previous
discussion illustrated,521 there are many cases when not using
derivatives may be very risky indeed.
B. Complexity
The recent losses at Gibson Greetings and Proctor & Gamble,
involving highly complex derivatives, would tend to encourage
the use of simpler derivatives. According to Stephen Savage, the
editor of the Value Line Mutual Fund Survey, "[there's been an
arms race to create more exotic, esoteric derivative securities,
with firms carving up securities and then getting exotic with the
leftovers that hadn't been put together with much forethought.
But you can now expect to see a slowdown in creation of new
derivatives."522 As for Proctor & Gamble, it plans to continue to
use "straightforward derivatives-plain vanillas," because they
provide a very "'effective way of managing interest rates and
foreign [currency] exposures.'"5 Conversely, there are those who
believe that today's foreign currency exchange, interest rate, and
commodity risks will require more complex, custom-tailored
products designed to hedge the specific risk in the particular
context.
52
C. Lawsuits
Many believe that the volume of lawsuits in this area is likely
to increase as rulings are made in the pending cases. 52 5 Accord-
ing to Edward Brodsky, a partner at Proskauer Rose LLP who
521. See supra notes 418-22 and accompanying text.
522. Leckey, supra note 3, at C3 (quoting Stephen Savage).
523. Loomis, supra note 4, at 68 (quoting Proctor & Gamble's CEO Edwin Astect).
524. See Derivatives Reconsidered, supra note 56, at *3 (reporting a view held by
Adam Frieman, managing director of the Strategic Derivatives Group at Bankers
Trust, the investment firm that has been sued by Gibson Greetings and Proctor &
Gamble, in part because of the complexity of the derivatives being recommended).
525. See Bencivenga, supra note 63, at 5.
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handles corporate and securities litigation, "'[olnce people start
hearing about big settlements, and I suspect they will, we'll be
hearing about other people joining the bandwagon.'"526 It is like-
ly that most of the pending cases will end in settlement. 27 Law-
yers often prefer private settlements for their clients when suing
a broker because settlements can avoid the unpleasant publicity
that often sparks suits by shareholders against the corpora-
tion.5 28 Lawsuits against brokers may also become increasingly
rare in the coming years due to the public's interest in increas-
ing the "transparency, integrity, and liquidity" of the derivatives
market.5 29 To that end, organized exchanges may become the
preferred trading venue. In addition, new disclosure require-
ments in the OTC market may reduce the potential for lawsuits
due to increased investor knowledge and oversight of transac-
tions.
CONCLUSION
Derivatives are dangerous only when used for speculation or
placed in the hands of inexperienced investors with inadequate
control or training. When properly used to hedge against risk,
derivatives are an essential corporate tool. Management and
corporate directors have a duty to educate themselves on how
derivatives could protect their corporation; set clear risk man-
agement policies that detail if and how derivatives can be used;
prudently implement the company's risk management policies
within sound, conservative parameters; and finally, diligently
oversee the investment strategy of the authorized employees to
ensure the policies of the corporation are adhered to within the
parameters clearly set out.
When corporations achieve this standard, risk will be allocat-
ed in the derivatives market between those investors who know-
ingly assume the burden of speculating and those corporations
who shift risk out of their portfolio. If derivatives debacles con-
526. Id.
527. See id.
528. See id.
529. Alfred Steinherr, Taming the Wild Beast of Derivatives, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 16,
1994, at *2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fintme File.
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tinue to make headlines, pressure may mount to implement
stronger government regulation of derivatives. The current ma-
jority view, held by Alan Greenspan on down through commen-
tators in financial circles, is that the private market is best able
to manage these products. It is incumbent on corporations to
take responsibility for their risk management policies, use the
best products available, and control the agents who implement
them.
